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I. INTRODUCTION
Occasionally Charles Jones urinated in his front yard.' This prob-
ably went unnoticed by his only neighbor; Jones lived on forty-one
acres of land, and the neighbor lived 250 yards away.2 It also proba-
bly went unnoticed by distant passerbys. Although a highway and a
county road intersected nearby, and his front yard was visible from
both roads,3 the speed of drivers (and the fact they would not be focus-
ing on Jones) likely made it difficult for them and their passengers to
discern what he was doing.4
Unfortunately for Jones, his comings and goings (and in particular,
his physical activities) became of interest to his employer after he filed
a workers' compensation claim. 5 His employer hired an investigation
1. See I.C.U. Investigations, Inc. v. Jones, 780 So. 2d 685, 687 (Ala. 2000).
2. Id. at 690 (Cook, J., dissenting).
3. Id. at 687.
4. This conclusion is supported by the fact that of the four occasions on which the
investigator videotaped Jones urinating (discussed below), only once did the in-
vestigator (who was stationary), through the use of the naked eye, suspect what




firm (aptly named "I.C.U. Investigations, Inc.") to watch his daily ac-
tivities, and an investigator, using a telephoto video camera, video-
taped Jones from the shoulder of the highway or the county road near
Jones's home.6 Four times the investigator videotaped Jones urinat-
ing in his front yard.7 At the end of each day's surveillance, the inves-
tigator copied the tapes and sent them to the attorney for Jones's
employer.8 When Jones learned he had been videotaped urinating, he
filed suit against his employer, the investigation firm, and the investi-
gator, asserting, among other things, a claim based on the tort of inva-
sion of privacy.9 The case went to trial against only the investigation
firm, and the jury returned a verdict in Jones's favor for $100,000.10
The investigation firm appealed the verdict to the Alabama Su-
preme Court. The case divided the justices six to three, with each of
the three dissenting justices writing a separate opinion.ll The major-
ity held that the jury verdict in Jones's favor could not stand. They
held that the investigation's purpose was legitimate,12 and that
"[because the activities Jones carried on in his front yard could have
been observed by any passerby,... any intrusion [by the investigation
firm] into Jones's privacy was not 'wrongful' and, therefore, was not
actionable."13
A dissenting justice felt that "a videotape of Jones urinating in his
yard served no legitimate purpose in [his] workers' compensation
case," and "[allthough Jones was in his front yard, the matter was
clearly personal in nature."14 This justice also felt that "given the dis-
tance [of Jones] from the highway, and the layout of his property, a
disputed issue existed as to whether Jones's activities were public."15
This justice believed that "a factual issue existed as to whether the
means used to videotape Jones was improper, offensive, and unrea-
sonable."16 Another dissenting justice felt that although "the investi-
gator was free to film Jones while he was in his front yard," the
investigator still invaded Jones's privacy "because he filmed an act
'not exhibited to the public gaze.'" 17 The third dissenting justice be-
lieved that "the issue of whether telephoto surveillance is offensive or
improper enough to constitute invasion of privacy is a jury ques-
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 687-88.
9. Id. at 688.
10. Id. at 687.
11. One of the dissenting opinions was written on the application for rehearing. See
id. at 693 (Johnstone, J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 689 (majority opinion).
13. Id. at 689-90.
14. Id. at 690 (Cook, J., dissenting).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 693 (England, J., dissenting).
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tion."18 This justice also felt it noteworthy that "the name of the [in-
vestigation firm]-ICU Investigations, Inc.-obviously intends a pun
on 'I see you' and implies prurient Peeping Tomism."19
The justices' disagreement was not surprising. The case included
many of the classic issues involving the tort of invasion of privacy,
such as: In which places does a person have a right of privacy? If a
person is in an area that can be viewed by others, does he or she at
least have the right to not be photographed or videotaped under cer-
tain circumstances? Does it matter that image-enhancing equipment,
such as a telephoto lens, is used? Is the purpose of the surveillance
relevant?
This Article addresses such issues with respect to employers con-
ducting surreptitious physical surveillance of employees. 20 Although
such surveillance might, under certain circumstances, be prohibited
by any one of a hodgepodge of non-tort sources,2 1 including the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution,2 2 federal legislation, 2 3
state constitutions,24 state legislation,25 and contract law,2 6 such
18. Id. (Johnstone, J., dissenting).
19. Id.
20. This Article is limited to physical surveillance and does not address monitoring
employee computer use (including electronic mail) or telephone conversations.
Such surveillance has already received considerable attention from other com-
mentators. This Article also does not address surveillance that is not surrepti-
tious, including surveillance that is performed in a physically intrusive or
harassing manner. See, e.g., Wolfson v. Lewis, 924 F. Supp. 1413, 1433-34 (E.D.
Pa. 1996) (holding that plaintiffs stated a claim for invasion of privacy when de-
fendants' surveillance constituted "a course of hounding, harassing, intimidating,
and frightening conduct"); Tucker v. Am. Employers' Ins. Co., 171 So. 2d 437,
437-39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (holding that genuine issue of fact existed as to
whether plaintiff could establish a claim for invasion of privacy when plaintiff
alleged that surveillance was done "in such a manner as to make the plaintiff and
the general public aware that she was being followed").
21. It has been correctly noted that "[pirivacy law is confusing because its sources
stem from tort law, constitutional law, criminal procedure, civil procedure, family
law, and contracts." Quentin Burrows, Scowl Because You're on Candid Camera:
Privacy and Video Surveillance, 31 VAL. U. L. REv. 1079, 1086 (1997).
22. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which prohibits the
government from undertaking "unreasonable searches and seizures," U.S. CONST.
amend. IV, is implicated when an employer conducts physical surveillance of its
employees. See, e.g., Thompson v. Johnson County Cmty. Coll., 930 F. Supp. 501,
507 (D. Kan. 1996) ("Domestic silent video surveillance is subject to Fourth
Amendment prohibitions against unreasonable searches."), affd, No. 96-3223,
1997 WL 139760 (10th Cir. Mar. 25, 1997) (unpublished table decision).
23. For example, surreptitious surveillance of employees' union activities violates
section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act. Wallace Press, Inc., 146
N.L.R.B. 1236, 1239 (1964).
24. Some state constitutions have an explicit right to privacy. See, e.g., CAL. CONST.
art. I, § 1 ("All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable
rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, pos-
sessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness,
20061 215
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and privacy."); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23 ("Every natural person has the right to
be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into the person's private
life . . . ).
25. Some states have enacted legislation prohibiting certain surveillance of employ-
ees by employers. For example, California has enacted a law prohibiting both
public and private employers (but not the federal government) from making a
video recording "of an employee in a restroom, locker room, or room designated by
an employer for changing clothes, unless authorized by court order." CAL. LAB.
CODE § 435(a) (West 1998). Another California statute prohibits any person from
attempt[ing] to capture, in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable
person, any type of visual image... of the plaintiff engaging in a per-
sonal or familial activity under circumstances in which the plaintiff had
a reasonable expectation of privacy, through the use of a visual ... en-
hancing device, regardless of whether there is a physical trespass, if this
image ... could not have been achieved without a trespass unless the
visual ... enhancing device was used.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.8(b) (West 2006). See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 653 (West
1995) (prohibiting two-way mirrors in washrooms and similar facilities). West
Virginia has enacted a law prohibiting an employer or any agent or representa-
tive of an employer from operating a surveillance device "for the purpose of re-
cording or monitoring the activities of the employees in areas designed for the
health or personal comfort of the employees or for safeguarding of their posses-
sions, such as rest rooms, shower rooms, locker rooms, dressing rooms and em-
ployee lounges." W. VA. CODE ANN. § 21-3-20 (West 1999). Connecticut has also
enacted a law prohibiting an employer or any agent or representative of an em-
ployer from operating any electronic surveillance device "for the purpose of re-
cording or monitoring the activities of the employees in areas designed for the
health or personal comfort of the employees or for safeguarding of their posses-
sions, such as restrooms, locker rooms or lounges." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-
48b (West 1980). Michigan has enacted a law that prohibits any person from
installing, placing, or using in any private place, without the consent of the per-
son or persons entitled to privacy in that place, any surveillance device. MiCH.
COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.539d (West 2004). "Private place" is defined as "a place
where one may reasonably expect to be safe from casual or hostile intrusion or
surveillance but does not include a place to which the public or substantial group
of the public has access." Id. § 750.539a(1). New York has enacted a law that
prohibits any person from installing or maintaining a two-way mirror or other
viewing device for the purpose of surreptitiously observing or recording a visual
image "of the interior of any fitting room, restroom, toilet, bathroom, washroom,
shower, or any other room assigned to guests or patrons in a motel, hotel or inn."
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 395-b (McKinney 2005). Additionally, if surveillance vio-
lates a criminal law, the conduct might thereby also be tortious. See, e.g., Galella
v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 994 (2d Cir. 1973) (affirming finding of invasion of pri-
vacy when conduct constituted harassment under New York's penal law); Souder
v. Pendleton Detectives, Inc., 88 So. 2d 716, 718 (La. Ct. App. 1956) (holding that
invasion-of-privacy claim would be stated if defendant's activities violated state's
criminal Peeping Tom statute).
26. Although it would be unusual for an employment contract between an employer
and an individual employee to prohibit surreptitious physical surveillance, some
collective bargaining agreements between employers and unions might include
such a prohibition. The use of hidden surveillance cameras by an employer is a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining with a union. See Colgate-Palmolive
Co., 323 N.L.R.B. 515 (1997).
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sources usually do not apply.2 7 The Fourth Amendment restricts only
government actors, 28 federal legislation prohibits only surveillance
that interferes with employees' self-organizing efforts and activities,29
state constitutional privacy provisions usually restrain only govern-
ment actors, 30 few states have enacted legislation prohibiting surveil-
lance,3 1 and contract law offers little protection because most
employees are employed on an at-will basis without employment con-
27. See, e.g., Robert G. Boehmer, Artificial Monitoring and Surveillance of Employ-
ees: The Fine Line Dividing the Prudently Managed Enterprise from the Modern
Sweatshop, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 739, 773-95 (1992) (concluding that constitutional
and statutory provisions are generally not sufficient to protect employees' privacy
interests); Kurt H. Decker, Employment Privacy Law for the 1990s, 15 PEPP. L.
REV. 551, 556-57 (1988) ("Federal and state legislation has been primarily fo-
cused on promoting unionization as a countervailing force against employer
power and control, and establishing a minimum level of economic entitlement for
employees." (footnotes omitted)).
28. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921). For an article advocating elimi-
nating the distinction between public employees and private employees as to in-
vasions of privacy, see S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Revisiting the Public/Private
Distinction: Employee Monitoring in the Workplace, 32 GA. L. REV. 825, 853
(1998).
29. See supra note 23; see also David N. King, Note, Privacy Issues in the Private-
Sector Workplace: Protection from Electronic Surveillance and the Emerging 'Pri-
vacy Gap', 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 441, 443 n.13 (1994) ("Federal legislation has never
directly addressed the concept of employee privacy."). An attempt to pass federal
legislation restricting the physical surveillance of employees failed. See The Pri-
vacy for Consumers and Workers Act (PWCA), S. 984, H.R. 1900, 103d Cong.
(1993) (failed bill that sought to impose restrictions on the monitoring of employ-
ees). On the PCWA and its fate, see generally Jill Yung, Big Brother IS Watch-
ing: How Employee Monitoring in 2004 Brought Orwell's 1984 to Life and What
the Law Should Do About It, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 163, 205-07 (2005). Profes-
sor Wilborn has argued for federal legislation establishing uniform privacy rights
for both public-sector and private-sector employees. See Wilborn, supra note 28.
I consider it questionable whether such legislation is within Congress's power to
enact. See generally United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608-09 (2000)
(stating that Congress's power to enact legislation under the Commerce Clause is
limited to regulating the use of channels of interstate commerce; regulating and
protecting the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce; and regulating activities having a substantial relation to
interstate commerce).
30. Kevin J. Conlon, Privacy in the Workplace, 72 CHI-KENr L. REV. 285, 286 (1996)
("Several states have incorporated specific privacy guarantees into their constitu-
tions. With the exception of California, these constitutional provisions do not ex-
tend to employees in the private sector.").
31. See, e.g., King, supra note 29, at 442-43 ("[S]tate legislative action has ... been
sluggish .... ."); Jeremy Friedman, Note, Prying Eyes in the Sky: Visual Aerial
Surveillance of Private Residences as a Tort, 4 COLUM. Sci. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 23,
(2003), available at http://www.stlr.org/html/volume4/friedman.pdf ("Privacy leg-
islation extending beyond the bounds of the common law is relatively
sparse . . . ."); Wilborn, supra note 28, at 843 ("State governments have not ad-
dressed the issue of workplace privacy comprehensively or uniformly, and in
many cases they have not addressed it at all.").
20061 217
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tracts prohibiting surveillance. 32 Thus, the tort of invasion of privacy
"remains the bedrock protection against unwarranted surveillance."3 3
In Part II of this Article, I address why an employer might want to
conduct surreptitious physical surveillance of its employees. In Part
III, I provide a brief history of the tort of invasion of privacy. In Part
IV, I review cases involving the tort as applied to employers' surrepti-
tious physical surveillance of employees and distill bright-line rules
from such cases. 34 In Part V, in response to critics of existing law who
seek to expand privacy rights (and, in particular, employee privacy
rights), I argue that there are insufficient reasons for judicially modi-
32. An employee will not be able to rely on contract law unless he or she (or his or her
union) has a contract with the employer prohibiting such surveillance. See Jeff
Kray & Pamela Robertson, Note, Enhanced Monitoring of White Collar Employ-
ees: Should Employers Be Required to Disclose?, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 131,
134 (1991) ("In the case of enhanced monitoring, strict application of the employ-
ment at will doctrine means that if the current employment contract does not
limit the employer's right to utilize enhanced monitoring [and it usually never
does), then an employee has no basis for a breach of contract action when the
employer implements such monitoring.").
33. Friedman, supra note 31, at 24. See also Frank J. Cavico, Invasion of Privacy in
the Private Employment Sector: Tortious and Ethical Aspects, 30 Hous. L. REV.
1263, 1266 (1993) ("The basic legal bulwark for private sector employee privacy
protection is the common law of torts, most often through the tort of invasion of
privacy."); Wilborn, supra note 28, at 829, 844 ("For the typical private-sector
employee, the only source of legal protection against intrusive employer surveil-
lance are claims brought under various state statutes or the common law tort of
invasion of privacy," and "[the tort that most plaintiffs use to challenge employer
monitoring and surveillance is the intrusion on seclusion tort."); Boehmer, supra
note 27, at 801 ("Still photographs or videos of employees without sound will gen-
erally be analyzed under common law privacy principles."); King, supra note 29,
at 442 ("[E]mployees most frequently turn to the common law of torts to safe-
guard their privacy rights ... ."); Conlon, supra note 30, at 289 ("Since constitu-
tional and statutory law provide limited privacy protection to individuals at
work, the discussion of worker privacy rights has largely focused on common law
privacy claims."). Although surveillance might be tortious as an intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress, that tort is difficult to establish, particularly in the
employment setting. See generally Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Re-
sistance, and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 1 (1988).
34. Many commentators have criticized the failure of the courts to state a clear rule
with respect to employee privacy rights. See, e.g., Cavico, supra note 33, at 1266
("Failure to address the issue of employee privacy in the workplace and to de-
velop fair and clear principles will beget perplexity, mistrust, acrimony, recrimi-
nation, and of course, litigation between employees and their employers."); id. at
1345 ("[U]ntil a settled body of privacy tort law develops for the use of modern
business technologies, it will be difficult to demarcate the line between acceptable
business practices and tortious invasions of employees' privacy."); Boehmer,
supra note 27, at 739 ("[T]he law provides employers with little guidance concern-
ing the permissible depths of their intrusions.... ."); King, supra note 29, at 459
("Courts have created numerous tests in conjunction with the invasion-into-seclu-
sion concept.").
[Vol. 85:212
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fying the rules currently being applied by the courts with respect to
employers' surreptitious physical surveillance of employees.
II. WHY AN EMPLOYER MIGHT CONDUCT SURREPTITIOUS
PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE OF EMPLOYEES
There are many reasons why an employer might conduct surrepti-
tious physical surveillance of its employees. 3 5 For example, an em-
ployer might want to monitor employees' work activities for
performance issues3 6 or to help establish efficient manufacturing
methods and procedures. 3 7 An employer might want to determine
whether employees are stealing38 or violating other company poli-
35. The United States Supreme Court has noted that "it is important to recognize the
plethora of contexts in which employers will have an occasion to intrude to some
extent on an employee's expectation of privacy." O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S.
709, 723 (1987). See also Cavico, supra note 33, at 1289 ("[E]mployers have many
persuasive and justifiable reasons to engage in surveillance."); Wilborn, supra
note 28, at 836-37 ("Employers provide a variety ofjustifications for maintaining
these invasive practices: to improve employee productivity, to better evaluate
work performance, to deter or uncover employee wrongdoing or dishonesty, even
to limit tort liability under the respondeat superior doctrine." (footnotes
omitted)).
36. See Am. MGMT. ASS'N, WORKPLACE MONITORING & SURVEILLANCE (2001), available
at http://www.amanet.org/research/pdfs/ems-short200l.pdf (finding that from
1997 to 2001, between 14% and 16% of major United States firms engaged in
video recording of employee job performance); see also Wilborn, supra note 28, at
831 (acknowledging "validity of the employer's interest in maintaining an effi-
cient and productive workplace"); Cavico, supra note 33, at 1288 ("Employers
may use surveillance technology to improve employee performance . . .");
Boehmer, supra note 27, at 745 ("[E]mployers naturally seek to use technology to
increase employee productivity."); Shefali N. Baxi & Alisa A. Nickel, Big Brother
or Better Business: Striking a Balance in the Workplace, KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y,
Fall 1994, at 137, 138 ("Monitoring, especially electronic monitoring, is important
to many employers for numerous reasons. These reasons include promoting effi-
ciency and quality in their employees' performance .... ).
37. See, e.g., Thomas v. Gen. Elec. Co., 207 F. Supp. 792, 799 (W.D. Ky. 1962) (em-
ployer photographed employee as part of studies to, among other things, increase
efficiency of employer's operations); Cavico, supra note 33, at 1289 ("Employers
may also implement a surveillance scheme in order to assess the organization's
performance and to ascertain how best to achieve business objectives and aug-
ment the bottom line. For example, by visually chronicling a production process
in order to create time and production routines, an employer can more efficiently
schedule employees, inventory, and equipment. Efficiencies developed by means
of surveillance may also help employers meet prime cost-control and cost-effec-
tive goals." (footnotes omitted)).
38. See, e.g., Acuffv. IBP, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 2d 914 (C.D. Ill. 1999) (employer installed
camera in ceiling tiles of office in response to items disappearing from office);
Thompson v. Johnson County Cmty. Coll., 930 F. Supp. 501 (D. Kan. 1996) (em-
ployer installed video surveillance camera to investigate allegation of theft), affd,
No. 96-3223, 1997 WL 139760 (10th Cir. Mar. 25, 1997) (unpublished table deci-
sion); Sacramento County Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n v. County of Sacramento, 59
Cal. Rptr. 2d 834 (Ct. App. 1996) (employer installed concealed video surveillance
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cies. 39 An employer might want to monitor work areas for safety4O or
determine whether employees are having clandestine meetings. 4 1 Or,
an employer might simply want to find out why the office coffee tastes
so bad.42
An employer might even want to conduct surveillance of an em-
ployee's activities outside the workplace. For example, an employer
might want to determine whether an employee is disclosing confiden-
tial company information,43 or an employer might suspect that an em-
ployee on medical leave or who is seeking or receiving workers'
compensation or disability benefits, is malingering.44 An employer
camera in ceiling overlooking cashier's register and safe in cashier's office in re-
sponse to incidents of theft); see also Boehmer, supra note 27, at 744 ("The efforts
of employers to reduce losses caused by the shocking levels of employee theft in
the United States provide a persuasive example of one legitimate reason for the
artificial monitoring and surveillance of employees." (footnote omitted)).
39. See, e.g., Munson v. Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 969 F.2d 266 (7th Cir. 1992)
(employer conducted surveillance of employee to determine if employee was vio-
lating policy requiring that he reside within city limits); Fayard v. Guardsmark,
Inc., Civ. A. No. 89-0108, 1989 WL 145958 (E.D. La. Nov. 29, 1989) (employer
conducted surveillance of employee to determine if employee was fraternizing
with an employee of client in violation of company policy); DeLury v. Kretchmer,
322 N.Y.S.2d 517 (Sup. Ct. 1971) (employer took employee's photograph at work
as part of investigation into employee wrongdoing); Brannen v. Kings Local Sch.
Dist. Bd. of Educ., 761 N.E.2d 84 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (employer installed video
camera in break room to determine if employees were taking excessive, unautho-
rized breaks).
40. See, e.g., Thomas, 207 F. Supp. at 799 (employer photographed employee as part
of studies to, among other things, promote safety of employees); Cavico, supra
note 33, at 1288 ("Employers have a responsibility to, and legitimate interest in,
providing a safe work environment. Calculated observation of employees can
lead to the development of safer production routines. Thus, surveillance can
serve the appropriate objective of protecting both employees and property." (foot-
notes omitted)); Boehmer, supra note 27, at 747 ("In an era of soaring insurance
premiums, consider the additional potential savings derived through monitoring
worker safety.").
41. See Wilborn, supra note 28, at 827 n.10 ("In one case, a company, after receiving
reports of employees having clandestine meetings, installed a camera at the en-
trance hallway to the women's locker room." (citing Courts Apply Broad Preemp-
tion Test to Emotional Distress, Privacy Claims, WASH. INSIDER (BNA), July 14,
1992, at 30)).
42. See Chris Kelly, War Ends, Alliance Dismantles, Leaving Coffee for Everyone,
TIMEs-TRIBUNE (Scranton, Pa.), Apr. 16, 2005, http'J/www.thetimes-tribune.com/
site/news.cfm?newsid=14360071&BRD=2185&PAG=461&deptid=422126&rfi=6
(employee allegedly caught on videotape urinating into office coffee pot).
43. Cavico, supra note 33, at 1287; see also Boehmer, supra note 27, at 744 ("In addi-
tion to the efforts of employers to protect their tangible property and time, em-
ployers increasingly must take affirmative steps to protect their interests in
intangible property, such as trade secrets.").
44. See, e.g., Stonum v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 2d 894 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (em-
ployer hired private investigator to conduct surveillance of employee who was
taking leave to allegedly care for her sick mother to determine if employee was
abusing her leave); Brady v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 652 (S.D. Miss.
220 [Vol. 85:212
LOOKING OUT FOR YOUR EMPLOYEES
might want to investigate allegations that an employee is using illegal
drugs.45
The expense of defending employment lawsuits is a particularly
good reason for employers to conduct surreptitious physical surveil-
lance, especially when the surveillance involves videotaping or
photographing the employee. As employers are faced with employees
who can assert more employment rights than ever, 46 many employers
are beginning to consider physical surveillance, and in particular, sur-
reptitious video surveillance, a potential equalizer. Employees are in-
1998) (employer suspected that employee on medical leave of absence and who
was receiving workers' compensation benefits was working for another employer,
and conducted surveillance that revealed plaintiff performing normally and with-
out apparent medical conditions); I.C.U. Investigations, Inc. v. Jones, 780 So. 2d
685 (Ala. 2000) (employer hired private investigator to conduct surveillance of
employee in preparation for workers' compensation trial); Johnson v. Corporate
Special Servs., Inc., 602 So. 2d 385 (Ala. 1992) (defendant conducted video sur-
veillance of plaintiff while investigating plaintiffs workers' compensation claim);
Fiorillo v. Berkley Adm'rs, No. CV010458400S, 2004 WL 1153678 (Conn. Super.
Ct. May 5, 2004) (third-party administrator retained by employer conducted sur-
veillance of employee who was seeking workers' compensation benefits to deter-
mine if she had obtained other employment and to determine extent of her
disabilities); Creel v. I.C.E. & Assocs., 771 N.E.2d 1276 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (em-
ployer conducted surveillance of employee seeking long-term disability benefits to
determine if she was working for another company and if she was disabled);
Souder v. Pendleton Detectives, Inc., 88 So. 2d 716 (La. Ct. App. 1956) (em-
ployer's insurance company hired detectives to conduct surveillance of employee
who had filed workers' compensation claim); York v. Gen. Elec. Co., 759 N.E.2d
865 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (employer conducted video surveillance of employee who
was seeking to increase his workers' compensation benefits); McLain v. Boise
Cascade Corp., 533 P.2d 343 (Or. 1975) (employer hired company to conduct sur-
veillance of employee who had requested hearing with the workers' compensation
board asking that his disability payments be reinstated); Turner v. Gen. Adjust-
ment Bureau, Inc., 832 P.2d 62 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (investigators masqueraded
as representatives of product marketing research committee to gain access to
home of person who had filed workers' compensation claim), overruled on other
grounds by Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134 (Utah
2001), rev'd on other grounds, 538 U.S. 408 (2003); Susan Ward, Muni Workers'
Comp Bills May Face Ax, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 22, 1999, at A17 (discussing mayor
airing surveillance videos of supposedly injured municipal workers doing heavy
physical work to demonstrate city's efforts to cut workers' compensation bills).
45. See, e.g., Salazar v. Golden State Warriors, No. C-99-4825 CRB, 2000 WL 246586
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2000) (employer hired private investigator to conduct surveil-
lance of employee in response to allegation employee was using illegal drugs).
46. For example, in the 1990s Congress enacted two monumental laws providing for
additional employee rights-the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000), and the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29
U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000). See also Wilborn, supra note 28, at 865 n.153
("Scholars have noted that th[e] decline in the influence of collective bargaining




creasingly filing lawsuits against their employers, 4 7 and the cost of
defending such lawsuits can be considerable.48 Employers under-
standably view the litigation process as expensive and risky (even
when they have violated no laws), leading them to settle most cases.4 9
Surreptitious video surveillance can greatly reduce the expense
and risk of litigation, and can often prevent lawsuits from ever being
filed. For example, through the use of surreptitious video surveil-
lance, an employer might obtain conclusive evidence of an employee
violating a particular work rule, which it can later use to respond to
any wrongful discharge claim. Without such evidence, the employer
might spend considerable money defending a baseless lawsuit.
Surreptitious video surveillance can also enable an employer to
safely terminate a malingering employee whom the employer would
not otherwise terminate for fear of a lawsuit alleging retaliation under
a workers' compensation law,50 a violation of the Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993,51 or discrimination or retaliation under the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990.52 Employers interested in avoiding
lawsuits, and winning those already filed, are realizing what insur-
ance companies defending workers' compensation and personal injury
cases discovered long ago-surveillance is often a cost effective way to
reduce expenses and losses.5 3
47. See generally Gregory Todd Jones, Testing for Structural Change in Legal Doc-
trine: An Empirical Look at the Plaintiffs Decision to Litigate Employment Dis-
putes a Decade After the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 997, 1028
(2002) (discussing increase in employment-related litigation).
48. See, e.g., Timothy S. Bland, EEOC Brings Mediation to the Table: Is it Right for
Your Client?, FED. LAW., July 2000, at 44, 44 ("The costs of defending employment
discrimination lawsuits can run well into six figures.").
49. See Labor Dep., Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, A Guide to Employment Discrimina-
tion Litigation, C779 ALI-ABA 457, 525 (1992) ("Most employment discrimina-
tion suits are settled rather than litigated to judgment.").
50. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 440.205 (2005) ("No employer shall discharge, threaten to
discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee's valid
claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under the Workers'
Compensation Law.").
51. See 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1) (2000) (requiring reinstatement of employee on family
or medical leave); id. § 2615 (prohibiting employer from retaliating against em-
ployee for asserting rights under the Act).
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000) (prohibiting discrimination against employee be-
cause of disability); id. § 12203(a) (prohibiting retaliation against employee for
exercising rights under Act).
53. Commentators have recognized the increase in employer surveillance of employ-
ees. See, e.g., Wilborn, supra note 28, at 826; ("Employees ... are increasingly
subject to monitoring, including... video surveillance.. . ."); Jonathan J. Green,
Note, Electronic Monitoring in the Workplace: The Need for Standards, 52 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 438, 438 (1984) ("Electronic surveillance of employees in the work-
place has become increasingly common in recent years."). Other factors, in addi-
tion to increased lawsuits, might be contributing to an increase in employer
monitoring of employees. For example, the cost of conducting such surveillance is
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Employers who engage in surreptitious physical surveillance of
employees, however, must consider when such surveillance violates
employees' privacy rights under the common law. Before addressing
this question, though, a brief history of the tort of invasion of privacy
is in order.
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TORT OF
INVASION OF PRIVACY
In 1890, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis wrote an article
entitled The Right to Privacy.54 The authors asserted that certain
court decisions based on defamation, the invasion of some property
right, or a breach of a confidence or an implied contract were actually
based on the broader concept of a right to privacy. 55 The authors ar-
gued that invasion of privacy should be recognized as a distinct cause
of action, and that a remedy should be provided for a breach.5 6 Their
article is considered the first time an independent tort for invasion of
privacy was suggested. 57 "Warren and Brandeis were not presenting
a picture of the law as it was, but of the law as they believed (or hoped)
it should be."58
Although courts were slow to adopt Warren's and Brandeis's inva-
sion-of-privacy tort, by the 1930s "the tide set in strongly in favor of
recognition, and the rejecting decisions began to be overruled."59 In
decreasing. Wilborn, supra note 28, at 886 n.220; see also Cavico, supra note 33,
at 1265 ("A greater number of employers have at their disposal the instruments
necessary to engage in surveillance. . . ."); Boehmer, supra note 27, at 765 ("The
relatively low purchase cost of artificial monitoring and surveillance systems may
well be the largest factor [in their increased use]."). Also, "an immense new array
of sophisticated technology is available to the employer." Cavico, supra note 33,
at 1265. Increased market competitiveness might also be a contributor.
Boehmer, supra note 27, at 765 ("[Ilncreasing market competitiveness corre-
spondingly increases the incentive to use artificial monitoring and surveillance.").




57. See Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123, 1127 (Alaska 1989)
("The right to privacy is a recent creation of American law. The inception of this
right is generally credited to a law review article published in 1890 by Louis
Brandeis and his law partner, Samuel Warren."); Decker, supra note 27, at 558
("The concept of privacy within the United States is generally traced to the
Harvard Law Review article written by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis
in 1890.... [Pirior to 1890 no cause of action for invasion of privacy could be
brought in America."); Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Com-
munity and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 958 (1989) ("The
origins of the tort of invasion of privacy lie in a famous article on The Right to
Privacy published in 1890 by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis.").
58. Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1335, 1347-48.
59. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 386 (1960).
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1960, William L. Prosser, then dean of the University of California
School of Law at Berkeley, announced that "[a]t the present time the
right of privacy, in one form or another, is declared to exist by the
overwhelming majority of the American courts."60
Prosser, in a law review article "that significantly influenced the
development of the common law,"61 surveyed the legal landscape, and
concluded that what had emerged from the decisions recognizing and
applying a right to privacy was not one tort, but "a complex of four."6 2
Prosser asserted that "[t]he law of privacy comprises four distinct
kinds of invasion of four different interests of the plaintiff, which are
tied together by the common name, but otherwise have almost nothing
in common except that each represents an interference with the right
of the plaintiff. . . 'to be let alone."63 Prosser identified these four
torts (or "sub-torts") as follows: (1) "[i]ntrusion upon the plaintiffs se-
clusion or solitude, or into his private affairs"; (2) "[plublic disclosure
of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff'; (3) "[p]ublicity
which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye"; and (4)
"[aippropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiffs name
or likeness." 6 4
With respect to the tort of intrusion upon the plaintiffs seclusion
or solitude, or into his or her private affairs (the tort with which we
are concerned),6 5 Prosser stated that "there must be something in the
nature of prying or intrusion."66 Prosser described the tort as includ-
ing physical intrusions, such as intruding into the plaintiffs home or
hotel room, or searching the plaintiffs shopping bag in a store. 67
60. Id.
61. Matthew W. Finkin, Employee Privacy, American Values, and the Law, 72 CHI-
KENT L. REV. 221, 257 (1996) [hereinafter Finkin, Employee Privacy]. Professor
Finkin disputes whether Prosser's article was an accurate restatement of Warren
and Brandeis's work, arguing that Prosser focused on "intrusion into seclusion"
as the tort's cohesive element, and incorrectly "ignored the legal concept of 'per-
sonality' employed by Warren and Brandeis in 1890 and developed more fully by
[Roscoe] Pound in 1915." Id. at 258.
62. Prosser, supra note 59, at 389.
63. Id. (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888)).
64. Id.
65. See Wilborn, supra note 28, at 846 n.81 ("Although the Restatement identifies
four possible categories of invasion of privacy, employee monitoring claims would
fall only under the category 'intrusion upon seclusion' unless the employer en-
gages in publication of the information obtained."); Kenneth A. Jenero & Lynne
D. Mapes-Riordan, Electronic Monitoring of Employees and the Elusive "Right to
Privacy," EMP. REL. L.J., Summer 1992, at 71, 81 (recognizing that of the four
categories of common law invasion of privacy, "[tihe privacy claim most likely to
be asserted in response to electronic surveillance of employees is intrusion upon
seclusion"). Interestingly, "Warren and Brandeis, who were concerned with the
evils of publication, do not appear to have had in mind any such thing as intru-
sion upon the plaintiffs seclusion or solitude." Prosser, supra note 59, at 389.
66. Prosser, supra note 59, at 390.
67. Id. at 389.
[Vol. 85:212
LOOKING OUT FOR YOUR EMPLOYEES
Prosser noted, however, that the principle protecting this branch of
the right to privacy was "soon carried beyond such physical intrusion,"
and was extended to such things as peering through the windows of a
home.68
Prosser also observed that "the thing into which there is prying or
intrusion must be, and be entitled to be, private."69 Thus, for
example,
[o]n the public street, or in any other public place, the plaintiff has no right to
be alone, and it is no invasion of his privacy to do no more than follow him
about. Neither is it such an invasion to take his photograph in such a place,
since this amounts to nothing more than making a record, not differing essen-
tially from a full written description, of a public sight which any one present
would be free to see.
70
But, "when he is confined to a hospital bed, and in all probability
when he is merely in the seclusion of his home, the making of a photo-
graph without his consent is an invasion of a private right, of which he
is entitled to complain."71
Prosser further observed that "the intrusion must be something
which would be offensive or objectionable to a reasonable man."72
Prosser concluded his discussion of the tort of intrusion by stating that
"[iit appears obvious that the interest protected by this branch of the
tort is primarily a mental one."73
Prosser's identification of four distinct torts was accepted by the
American Law Institute and incorporated into the Restatement (Sec-
68. Id. at 390.
69. Id. at 391.
70. Id. at 391-92.
71. Id. at 392 (footnote omitted).
72. Id. at 390-91.
73. Id. at 392. See also Finkin, Employee Privacy, supra note 61, at 221-28 (assert-
ing that tort regulates outrage, rather than privacy, and that tort is designed to
protect persons from emotional distress); Post, supra note 57, at 958 ("The stated
purpose of the tort is to provide redress for 'injury to [a] plaintiffs emotions and
his mental suffering."). But see Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of
Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 974 (1964) ("I
contend that the gist of the wrong in the intrusion cases is not the intentional
infliction of mental distress but rather a blow to human dignity, an assault on
human personality. Eavesdropping and wire-tapping, unwanted entry into an-
other's home, may be the occasion and cause of distress and embarrassment but
that is not what makes these acts of intrusion wrongful. They are wrongful be-
cause they are demeaning of individuality, and they are such whether or not they
cause emotional trauma."); Post, supra note 57, at 961 (arguing that the relevant
issue is whether a reasonable person would suffer and that "the pain or displea-
sure at issue cannot be understood as actual sensations or emotions"); id. at 964
("[Tihe injury at issue is logically entailed by, rather than merely contingently
caused by, the improper conduct. An intrusion of privacy is intrinsically harmful
because it is defined as that which injures social personality."); id. at 968 ("The
underlying structure of the privacy tort is as much oriented toward safeguarding




ond) of Torts,7 4 and courts in a majority of the states have accepted
the torts, usually relying on each of the Restatement's definitions.7 5
With respect to the tort of intrusion, the Restatement, following Pros-
ser's lead, provides that "[olne who intentionally intrudes, physically
or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private
affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his
privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable per-
son."76 Accordingly, to establish this tort under the Restatement's def-
inition, the plaintiff must prove: (1) an intrusion; (2) the intrusion was
intentional; (3) the intrusion was upon the plaintiffs solitude or seclu-
sion, or his or her private affairs or concerns; and (4) the intrusion
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. 7 7 Some courts also
require that the intrusion cause mental anguish,7 8 which is consistent
with Prosser's belief that the interest protected by the tort is primarily
a mental one. 79
74. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977). It has been noted that the
American Law Institute's acceptance of Prosser's theory was not surprising be-
cause Prosser served as "reporter" for the project, and the reporter is perhaps the
project's most important person. See Andrew J. McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law
Out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability for Intrusion in Public Places, 73 N.C.
L. REV. 989, 998 n.40 (1995). The Restatement (First) of Torts recognized the tort
of invasion of privacy as follows: 'A person who unreasonably and seriously inter-
feres with another's interest in not having his affairs known to others or his like-
ness exhibited to the public is liable to the other." RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS
§ 867 (1939).
75. McClurg, supra note 74, at 998; see also Finkin, Employee Privacy, supra note 61,
at 223-24 ("With some exceptions ... most states apply the formulation of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts."); Wilborn, supra note 28, at 844 (noting that tort
of intrusion is "[r]ecognized in virtually every state").
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
77. Id.; see also Jensen v. State, 72 P.3d 897, 902 (Idaho 2003) ("Liability for a claim
of invasion of privacy by intrusion requires: (1) an intentional intrusion by the
defendant; (2) into a matter, which the plaintiff has a right to keep private; (3) by
the use of a method, which is objectionable to the reasonable person."); Jenero &
Mapes-Riordan, supra note 65, at 81 (noting that under the Restatement's defini-
tion of intrusion upon seclusion, "proof of three essential elements is required to
state a valid claim of intrusion upon seclusion: (1) an intrusion, (2) into a private
matter (3) that is highly offensive to a reasonable person."). Professor Finkin has
summarized the elements as follows: "[A] particular invasive action that exceeds
one's reasonable expectation of privacy and is highly objectionable to a reasona-
ble person." Finkin, Employee Privacy, supra note 61, at 239.
78. See, e.g., Hoth v. Am. States Ins. Co., 735 F. Supp. 290, 293 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Mel-
vin v. Burling, 490 N.E.2d 1011, 1013-14 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); see also King, supra
note 29, at 459 ("Most courts have followed the Illinois approach."). But see RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652H (1977) (entitling plaintiff to recover dam-
ages for "the harm to his interest in privacy resulting from the invasion" or for
"his mental distress"); Post, supra note 57, at 964-65 (arguing that emotional
distress is not necessary to establish invasion-of-privacy tort).
79. Prosser, supra note 59, at 392.
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Having surveyed the background of the tort of intrusion, we can
now turn to how courts have responded to claims by an employee that
an employer's surreptitious physical surveillance of him or her consti-
tuted such a tort. I will review cases involving surveillance outside
the workplace as well as inside the workplace. As will be seen, courts
have been reluctant to treat surreptitious physical surveillance of em-
ployees as tortious, except in limited circumstances.8 0
IV. CASE LAW INVOLVING EMPLOYERS' SURREPTITIOUS
PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE OF EMPLOYEES AND
THE TORT OF INTRUSION
Of the four torts of invasion of privacy identified by Prosser and
the Restatement, the first-intrusion upon the plaintiffs seclusion or
solitude, or into his or her private affairs or concerns-is implicated by
an employer's surreptitious physical surveillance of its employees.S1
"Surveillance, depending on how it is conducted, may constitute such
an intrusion."8 2
Such surveillance, however, even video surveillance, "does not in
itself violate a reasonable expectation of privacy. The intrusiveness of
[the surveillance] depends on the circumstances."8 3 As one court
stated, "[E]very controversy (on invasion of privacy) must necessarily
turn upon its own peculiar facts."8 4 Generally, "[ilf conducted in a
reasonable and non-obtrusive manner, it is not actionable."8 5 "It is
only where the intrusion has gone beyond the limits of decency that
liability accrues."8 6
Thus, a review of the cases involving employers' surreptitious
physical surveillance of employees is necessary to identify when such
surveillance is an invasion of privacy. The cases are discussed below
in the context of each of the four Restatement factors involved in an
invasion-of-privacy claim based on intrusion. It is my hope to distill
80. For example, one commentator has stated, with respect to surveillance within the
workplace: "[Tihose states that recognize [the tort of invasion of privacy] do not
extend its protection to employees in the workplace beyond the most egregious of
invasions." Jeremy E. Gruber, Re: Electronic Monitoring in the Workplace: Com-
mon Law & Federal Statutory Protection, PLI LITI., Mar.-Apr. 2001, at 351, 353.
81. See, e.g., King, supra note 29, at 459 ("[llnvasion into seclusion is most adaptable
to electronic-monitoring cases . . ").
82. Pemberton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 502 A.2d 1101, 1117 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1986). See also Decker supra note 27, at 560-61 ("Privacy interests are... impli-
cated where an employer conducts routine surveillance and monitoring.").
83. Salazar v. Golden State Warriors, No. C-99-4825 CRB, 2000 WL 246586, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2000) (footnote omitted).
84. Earp v. City of Detroit, 167 N.W.2d 841, 845 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969) (quoting Gill v.
Curtis Publ'g Co., 231 P.2d 565, 568 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951), affd, 239 P.2d 630 (Cal.
1952)).
85. Pemberton, 502 A.2d at 1117.
86. Aquino v. Bulletin Co., 154 A.2d 422, 426 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1959).
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from such cases bright-line rules and to give content to the vague
standard of whether the limits of decency have been passed.
A. Intrusion
To establish the tort of invasion of privacy based on intrusion there
must, of course, be an intrusion. Any surreptitious physical surveil-
lance, and in particular any such surveillance that uses electronic de-
vices, is presumably sufficient to be an intrusion as that term is used
in the Restatement.8 7 Whether, however, there has been an intrusion
when there is an attempted, but not accomplished, surveillance, is a
more difficult question. The few courts that have addressed this issue
have reached conflicting results. As discussed below, this division per-
haps reveals a fundamental disagreement over the tort's very nature.
87. See Jenero & Mapes-Riordan, supra note 65, at 81 ("Electronic surveillance...
generally is viewed as an 'intrusion' sufficient to establish the first element of the
prima facie case."). Whether surreptitious physical surveillance is, in fact, an
"intrusion," is an issue beyond the scope of this Article, if for no other reason than
because no one seems to be suggesting it is not. It is worth noting, however, that
it is arguable that surreptitious physical surveillance is not an intrusion. The
dictionary definition of "intrude" is "to thrust oneself in without invitation, per-
mission, or welcome," MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 657 (11th ed.
2003), which suggests surreptitious physical surveillance is an intrusion under,
at best, a weak sense of the word. The dictionary definition of "intrusion," while
simply noting that it is the "act of intruding or the state of being intruded," then
states that it especially means "the act of wrongfully entering upon, seizing, or
taking possession of the property of another," id., further supporting the belief
that surreptitious physical surveillance is an intrusion under, at best, a weak
sense of the word. Unfortunately, the Restatement does not define "intrusion."
Under the definition of "intrusion" provided in the sixth edition of Black's Law
Dictionary (essentially a definition of"trespass"), it would seem as though surrep-
titious physical surveillance is not an intrusion. See BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY
823 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "intrusion" as the "[a]ct of wrongfully entering upon
or taking possession of property of another"). The current edition, though, has
added an additional meaning taken directly from the tort of invasion of privacy.
See BLAc's LAw DICTIONARY 842 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "intrusion" as follows:
"In an action for invasion of privacy, a highly offensive invasion of another per-
son's seclusion or private life."). Under the definition provided in the current edi-
tion, if surreptitious physical surveillance is an "intrusion" under the tort of
invasion of privacy, then it is an intrusion according to Black's Law Dictionary.
In other words, if the courts define it as an "intrusion," then it is an "intrusion."
While perhaps Black's Law Dictionary cannot be faulted for taking this approach
(because it is defining words in their legal context), the definition provides no
guidance for determining when an intrusion has occurred for purposes of the tort
of invasion of privacy. One of the difficulties encountered in attempting to define
intrusion is that the word itself connotes wrongdoing, but whether the defen-
dant's conduct was wrongful is more easily addressed in the tort's other factors.
For ease of analysis, it is better to simply assume that any surreptitious physical
surveillance is an "intrusion," and to address the issue of whether it was wrongful
when analyzing the tort's other factors.
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In the employment context, courts have held that an attempted
surveillance by an employer is not an intrusion.8 8 Thus, according to
these courts, if an employer places a video camera in the ceiling of an
employee restroom to catch a thief, but no footage is taken, there is at
most an attempted invasion of privacy, for which there is no cause of
action.8 9 Even when an employer operates a video camera in an area
in which employees have a reasonable expectation of privacy, it is the
employee's burden to demonstrate that he or she was in that area dur-
ing the time footage was taken.90 The holdings in these cases are con-
sistent with the notion that there is no cause of action for an
attempted tort.9 1
One court, however, in a non-employment context, has accepted
the argument that an intrusion occurs as a result of an attempted sur-
veillance.92 In Harkey v. Abate,93 the court reversed a summary judg-
ment in the defendant's favor even though there was no proof the
defendant viewed the plaintiff and her daughter (on whose behalf the
plaintiff was also suing).
88. California, however, has enacted a statute that makes it a tort for a person to
'attempt to capture" an image under certain circumstances. See CAL. Crv. CODE
§ 1708.8(b) (West 2006).
89. Meche v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 692 So. 2d 544, 547 (La. Ct. App. 1997).
90. See Brazinski v. Amoco Petrol. Additives Co., 6 F.3d 1176, 1183 (7th Cir. 1993)
(applying Illinois law and affirming district court's grant of summary judgment
to defendant on plaintiffs invasion-of-privacy claim when plaintiff failed to intro-
duce evidence she frequented company locker room that was placed under video
surveillance).
91. See United States v. Stefonek, 179 F.3d 1030, 1036 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that
there are no "attempted torts"); Anthony J. Sebok, Deterrence or Disgorgement?
Reading Ciraolo After Campbell, 64 MD. L. REV. 541, 565 (2005) ("[U]nlike in
criminal law, there is no cause of action for attempted tort]."); Ernest J. Weinrib,
Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract Remedies, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55,
91 n.99 (2003) ('[Tlhere are attempted crimes but not attempted torts.").
92. In addition to the case discussed below, the decision in Doe v. B.P.S. Guard Ser-
vices, Inc., 945 F.2d 1422 (8th Cir. 1991) (applying Missouri law), a case involving
the surreptitious videotaping of models in a dressing area, has been character-
ized as finding that 'the act of placing the video cameras in the dressing area was
an unreasonable intrusion in and of itself." Thomas v. Kan. City Police Dep't, No.
04-0626-CV-W-RED, 2006 WL 27117, at *13 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 5, 2006). I am not
convinced this is a proper reading of Doe. In Doe, some of the plaintiffs could not
prove they had been videotaped in a state of undress, and the defendant argued
that the invasion-of-privacy claim for those plaintiffs failed as a result. See Doe,
945 F.2d at 1427. The court, without much discussion, rejected this argument,
simply stating that '[slo long as there was an objectionable intrusion into the
plaintiffs' enjoyment of an area in which the plaintiffs had a right and expecta-
tion of privacy, it is not necessary to the plaintiffs' cause of action that they be
viewed in a state of undress." Id. It appears, however, that all of the plaintiffs
were at least subjected to surveillance, even if they were not seen in a state of
undress. See id. at 1424 (security guards 'focused the camera on the plaintiffs
and taped them as they were changing clothes for the fashion show").
93. 346 N.W.2d 74 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
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In Harkey, the defendant, who owned a roller-skating rink, in-
stalled see-through panels in the ceiling of the women's restroom, al-
lowing surreptitious observation of the restroom's interior, including
the separately partitioned stalls.94 The plaintiff and her daughter
were patrons of the roller-skating rink, and at some point after using
the restroom, discovered the see-through panels.9 5
The plaintiff, individually and as next friend of her daughter, filed
suit against the defendant, alleging the defendant viewed her and her
daughter while they used the restroom. 9 6 The defendant contended,
however, that he did not view the plaintiff or her daughter, and the
plaintiff conceded that there appeared to be no proof he had.97 The
plaintiff argued, though, that such proof was unnecessary to establish
a claim for invasion of privacy, 98 and the appellate court agreed.9 9
The court held that "the installation of the hidden viewing devices
alone constitutes an interference with that privacy which a reasonable
person would find highly offensive."l 0 0
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on Hamberger v. East-
man,101 in which the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that an
invasion-of-privacy tort occurred when the defendant landlord in-
stalled an eavesdropping device in the plaintiffs' bedroom, even
though the plaintiffs could not prove the defendant listened to or over-
heard any sounds or voices from the bedroom.10 2 The court in Harkey
also relied on a Michigan statute that made the defendant's conduct
criminal, stating that the statute showed there existed "a legislative
expression of public policy opposed to such conduct."10 3 The court
thus concluded that the absence of proof that the see-through panels
were used did not preclude an invasion-of-privacy claim, though it
might affect the plaintiffs damages.' 0 4 One judge dissented on the
grounds that the plaintiff and her daughter were never viewed and
therefore could not have been injured.105
The holding in Harkey is hard to reconcile with the cases that re-
jected claims based on attempted surveillances. The holdings could
perhaps be reconciled if we knew that the plaintiff and her daughter
in Harkey had discovered the see-through panels while in the rest-





99. Id. at 76.
100. Id.
101. 206 A.2d 239 (N.H. 1964).
102. Id. at 242.
103. 346 N.W.2d at 76.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 77 (Gillis, J., dissenting).
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room. If so, the case could arguably be explained as one involving a
defendant engaging in an activity that disturbs the plaintiffs solitude,
irrespective of whether the defendant obtained private information
about the plaintiff.1oG This was possibly the basis for the court's hold-
ing in Eastman; in that case, the plaintiffs discovered the listening
devices while in their bedroom.107
Unfortunately, the court in Harkey simply states that the plaintiff
"thereafter discovered that the defendant had installed see-through
panels,"OS leaving it unclear as to when the discovery was made
(though the court's language suggests it was after the plaintiff left the
restroom). If the discovery was made after they left the restroom, it
seems that no claim for the tort of intrusion should have existed. A
person who learns after the fact of a surveillance device that was not
used could not have had his or her solitude or seclusion disturbed.
The holding in Harkey might be distinguished from the cases that
have not recognized a claim for an attempted surveillance on the basis
that the Michigan legislature enacted a law criminalizing the conduct
engaged in by the defendant. Such a law demonstrates a public policy
in Michigan to prevent this type of conduct, and one could argue that
courts should rely on a community's articulation of a moral norm
through the legislature to determine when conduct is tortious.109
I believe, however, that a hair-splitting effort to reconcile Harkey
with the cases that have rejected claims based on an attempted sur-
veillance is ultimately unavailing. I suspect the holding in Harkey
was based on one of two factors, or both, neither of which enables its
holding to be reconciled with the cases holding that an attempted sur-
veillance is not actionable.
First, I suspect the court was troubled by the difficulty a plaintiff
faces in proving that the defendant operated or made use of the sur-
veillance device, or if used, that the defendant viewed the plaintiff. If,
however, this concern motivated the court, it would have been better
106. For example, with respect to De May v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146 (Mich. 1881), in
which an invasion-of-privacy claim was stated when the defendant was an unin-
vited spectator to the plaintiff giving birth, there presumably still would have
been an intrusion if the defendant had been blind. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b (1977) ("The invasion may be by physical intrusion
into a place in which the plaintiff has secluded himself, as when the defendant
forces his way into the plaintiffs room in a hotel or insists over the plaintiffs
objection in entering his home."). When, however, a claim is recognized in such a
situation, it is through the use of a weak sense of the word "privacy." See infra
note 170. In fact, the facts in Harkey are strikingly similar to Professor Hyman
Gross's "key-to-the-castle" scenario discussed infra note 170.
107. Eastman, 206 A.2d at 240.
108. Harkey, 346 N.W.2d at 75 (emphasis added).
109. See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAw 14-16 (1988)
(arguing that courts, when deciding common law cases, rely on the community's
moral norms as revealed in official sources).
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for the court to have devised a rule that shifts the burden of proof to
the defendant to prove that he or she did not operate the device when
the plaintiff was present (something similar to res ipsa loquitur or the
principle that a party should bear the burden of proof when the evi-
dence bearing on the issue is within its control).1 1 0 Whether such an
approach is suitable is a matter beyond the scope of this Article; I sug-
gest it merely as a possible (and better) alternative to holding that an
attempted surveillance is actionable.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the court seems to have
been employing a definition of privacy different from, and more expan-
sive than, the definition employed by the courts that rejected claims
based on an attempted surveillance. The court in Harkey appears to
have been protecting the plaintiff and her daughter against conduct
that it deemed contrary to social norms and that was demeaning.I"'
If this is so, Harkey represents a significant expansion of the tort of
invasion of privacy, and any conduct contrary to social norms and
demeaning to a plaintiff could, consistent with Harkey, be made
tortious.
This, however, is certainly not the intent of invasion of privacy
lawl12 and would turn the tort into a catch-all cause of action making
tortious any demeaning conduct. Because the concept of privacy is
subject to many different definitions, it is important to have the tort
limited by clear boundaries. Prosser's identification of four sub-torts
serves this function. By treating an attempted surveillance as an in-
trusion even when the attempted surveillance was discovered only af-
ter the fact stretches the definition of an intrusion beyond its
generally accepted meaning and threatens to eradicate the tort's es-
tablished boundaries. If this happens, employers will be unable to
predict where a court will place the boundaries on any given day. Ad-
ditionally, an attempted surveillance, while perhaps morally wrong,
should not give rise to liability because the consequences of an at-
tempted surveillance (the mental distress over thinking about what
110. See John K Hicks, Note, What Should We Do With the Fire Defense, Late in the
Evening?, 83 TEx L. REV. 1225, 1258 (2005) ("One factor for a court to consider in
allocating the burden of proof is each party's access to the evidence required to
carry the burden.").
111. The court was surely also motivated by the fact that the attempted surveillance
caused injury (albeit emotional), a factor usually not present in an attempted tort
(and perhaps the strongest reason for holding there is no such thing as liability
for an attempted tort, particularly when the primary goal of tort law is compensa-
tion). See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 2, at 7 (5th ed. 1984).
112. I realize that exactly whose intent one would look to in a situation like this is not
easy to answer.
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could have been) are not sufficiently grave to warrant the cost of offi-
cial intervention.11 3
Therefore, because there is more justification for rejecting than ac-
cepting an attempted surveillance as an invasion of privacy, I will re-
ject such a notion for purposes of stating a bright-line rule as to when
surreptitious surveillance is tortious.
B. Intentional
The tort of invasion of privacy is generally considered an inten-
tional tort.1 1 4 The Restatement defines "intent" to mean "that the ac-
tor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes that
the consequences are substantially certain to result from it. " ll5 "The
intent with which tort liability is concerned is not necessarily a hostile
intent, or a desire to do any harm. Rather it is an intent to bring
about a result which will invade the interests of another in a way that
the law forbids."116 Thus, malice is not a necessary element of
intent.117
Rarely is intent (or lack of it) an issue in cases involving an em-
ployer's surreptitious physical surveillance of employees. Usually, the
113. See EISENBERG, supra note 109, at 29 ("The policy of social gravity is that morally
wrongful conduct should not give rise to liability unless its consequences are nor-
mally of sufficient importance, in terms of either the societal interests implicated
or the injury likely to result, to justify the social cost of official intervention.").
This is not to say that official intervention might not be warranted under crimi-
nal laws. Official intervention might be warranted in that context to deter future
attempts, but tort law, which is primarily concerned with compensation, does not
justify intervention when the harm is not sufficiently grave.
114. Scott v. Estes, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1275 (M.D. Ala. 1999). Most courts have
refused to recognize a claim for negligent invasion of privacy. See, e.g., Noonan,
Astley & Pearce v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., No. 95-55693, 1997 WL 30324, at
*1-2 (9th Cir. Jan. 21, 1997) (unpublished table decision) (refusing to recognize
claim for negligent invasion of privacy); Bailer v. Erie Ins. Exch., 687 A.2d 1375,
1380-81 (Md. 1997) (same); Snakenberg v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 383 S.E.2d 2, 7
(S.C. Ct. App. 1989) (same); Doe v. Mobile Video Tapes, Inc., 43 S.W.3d 40, 54
(Tex. App. 2001) (same, despite other Texas courts having done so).
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965). See also Snakenberg, 383 S.E.2d
at 6 ("For purposes of civil liability, an act is intentional if (1) it is done willingly;
and either (2) the actor desires the result of his conduct, whatever the likelihood
of that result happening; or (3) the actor knows or ought to know the result will
follow from his conduct, whatever his desire may be as to that result.").
116. KEETON ET AL., supra note 111, § 8, at 36 (footnote omitted). One court has stated
that "an actor commits an intentional intrusion only if he believes, or is substan-
tially certain, that he lacks the necessary legal or personal permission to commit
the intrusive act." O'Donnell v. United States, 891 F.2d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir.
1989). This is a curious definition because it would protect those ignorant of the
law and would have significant (beneficial) consequences for employers con-
ducting surreptitious surveillance. As long as the employer is not substantially
certain that its conduct is tortious, its conduct is thereby rendered not tortious.
117. Snakenberg, 383 S.E.2d at 6.
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employer intends to conduct the surveillance and intends to learn
whether the employee is engaging in the very activity that is ulti-
mately viewed during the surveillance. The issue of intent, however,
would be relevant when an employer conducts surreptitious surveil-
lance of a particular location without knowing employees use the loca-
tion to engage in private activities. This was the issue in Acuff v. IBP,
Inc.118
In Acuff, the employer installed a camera in the ceiling tiles of the
nurse manager's office because items were disappearing from the of-
fice.119 According to the employer, the employees who decided to have
the camera installed, and those who actually installed it, did not know
the office was used for employee medical examinations.' 2 0
After the surveillance became common knowledge among employ-
ees, employees who had been treated in the office while surveillance
occurred sued for invasion of privacy. 121 The employer argued, among
other things, that it could not be held liable because it did not intend
to invade the employees' privacy. 122 The court, however, rejected that
argument. 12 3 The court held that a nurse manager who was employed
by the defendant was aware medical examinations occurred in the of-
fice, and her knowledge could be imputed to the defendant.124 The
court further held that there was sufficient evidence to conclude that
an employee who viewed the videotapes thereafter became aware the
office was being used for examinations and failed to stop the
videotaping.125
The first ground for holding the employer liable is specious. There
cannot be constructive knowledge and assumed intent for an inten-
tional tort.126 Also, the tort concept of transferred intent would not
apply because the concept is generally premised on the belief that the
defendant's conduct is wrongful, and "the fault is regarded as absolute
toward all the world."127 In Acuff, the defendant's conduct, unlike fir-
ing a gun at one person and hitting another, was not wrongful toward
the intended subject of the surveillance (the employee who was steal-
ing items from the nurse manager's office). Additionally, an assault is
118. 77 F. Supp. 2d 914 (C.D. Ill. 1999).
119. Id. at 918.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 921.
123. Id. at 922-23.
124. Id. at 923.
125. Id.
126. For example, with respect to employment discrimination, it has been stated that
"[d]iscrimination is about actual knowledge, and real intent, not constructive
knowledge and assumed intent." Silvera v. Orange County Sch. Bd., 244 F.3d
1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2001).
127. KEETON ET AL., supra note 111, § 8, at 38.
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necessary to transfer intent when the harm caused is a mental
disturbance.128
The second ground, however, is supportable because intent does
not require that a person intend the particular consequence if he or
she knows the consequences are "substantially certain to result from
the act." 129 Therefore, if an employee who was aware of the videotap-
ing learned that medical examinations were occurring in the office
and failed to stop the taping (and the omissions of that employee could
be attributed to the employer), the employer should be held liable for
the continued taping (but not the prior taping).130
C. Intrusion into Solitude or Seclusion of Another, or His or
Her Private Affairs or Concerns
"The intrusion on the plaintiff must concern those aspects of him-
self, his home, his family, his personal relationships, and his commu-
nications which one normally expects will be free from exposure to the
defendant."13 1 Thus, "[tihe tort of intrusion upon seclusion . . . re-
quires a determination of what is private."132
This factor is composed of two related sub-factors. First, the plain-
tiff must be engaged in some activity, or be disclosing some matter,
that is private. 133 Second, the plaintiff must reasonably, and justifia-
bly, expect his or her activity to be free from exposure to the defen-
dant.13 4 Each sub-factor is discussed below.
1. Private Activities
Certain activities are obviously private, such as Jones's act of uri-
nating. 135 A medical examination13 6 or undressing 137 are other
examples.
128. Id. at 39.
129. Id. at 34 (citation omitted). Thus, "[tihe actor who fires a bullet into a dense
crowd may fervently pray that the bullet will hit no one, but if the actor knows
that it is unavoidable that the bullet will hit someone, the actor intends that
consequence." Id. at 35.
130. Interestingly, there was no discussion in I.C. U. Investigations, Inc. v. Jones, 780
So. 2d 685 (Ala. 2000), regarding whether the defendant's alleged invasion of pri-
vacy was unintentional. Perhaps this is because on at least one occasion the in-
vestigator suspected Jones was urinating, see id. at 687, and thus knew it was
substantially certain that videotape of him urinating was being obtained.
131. Snakenberg v. Hartford Cus. Ins. Co., 383 S.E.2d 2, 6 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989).
132. Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1090 (2002).
133. See Acosta v. Scott Labor LLC, 377 F. Supp. 2d 647, 650 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (holding
that plaintiff must allege intrusion with respect to private facts, such as finan-
cial, medical, or sexual matters, and that failure to do so defeats claim).
134. One court has stated that the plaintiff must attempt to keep the private facts
private. Id.
135. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989) ("There are
few activities in our society more personal or private than the passing of urine."
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Importantly for our purposes, however, an employee's work-related
activities are generally not considered private. For example, in Smith
v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co.,138 the plaintiff sued her former em-
ployer for, among other things, invasion of privacy, alleging that the
employer had kept her under close observation while she worked. 13 9
The court rejected the claim, holding that "[u]nreasonable intrusion of
seclusion is not implicated because the allegations do not involve inva-
sions of [the plaintiffs] solitude or personal affairs. Instead, the alle-
gations concern [the defendant's] business affairs."140 Similarly, in
Acosta v. Scott Labor LLC,141 the court held that surreptitious vide-
otaping by an employee of other employees (including one of the em-
ployer's principals) did not state a claim because the videotaping was
not of private facts.142 The court noted that the fact the plaintiff
worked at the company was not highly personall4 3 and held that "em-
ployment is not inherently private as a matter of law."144
The case of Schibursky v. International Business Machines
Corp. ,145 although involving the tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, is also instructive. The plaintiff alleged that after she
used her employer's open-door policy to appeal a performance ap-
praisal, her employer subjected her to unwarranted and oppressive
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Nat'l Treasury Employees' Union v.
Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1987), affd in part, rev'd in part, 489 U.S.
656 (1989))); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAw § 5.03 cmt. b (Tentative
Draft No. 3, 2005) ("Bodily... functions have traditionally been regarded as ar-
eas in which individuals, including employees and applicants for employment,
enjoy substantial protection in their privacy"); id. § 5.03(2) (stating that
"[mionitoring an employee or applicant while the employee or applicant performs
an excretory function typically performed outside of the presence of others" in-
trudes on the employee's or applicant's privacy interests); Note, From Private
Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth Amendment Protection,
43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 968, 979 n.73 (1968) ("Sexual and excretory activities... are
closely guarded in our society."). Whether Jones voluntarily exposed that activity
to the defendant's view, or reasonably should have expected surveillance, should
not be confused with the separate issue of whether the type of activity engaged in
is a private activity.
136. See Acuff v. IBP, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 2d 914, 924 (C.D. Ill. 1999) ('There are few
things in life that are more private than medical treatments and/or
examinations.").
137. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAw § 5.03(3) (Tentative Draft No. 3,
2005) (stating that "[oibserving an employee's or applicant's body in a state of
undress" intrudes on the employee's or applicant's privacy interests).
138. 777 F. Supp. 854 (D. Colo. 1991).
139. Id. at 855-56.
140. Id. at 857 (citation omitted).
141. 377 F. Supp. 2d 647 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
142. Id. at 650.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 652.
145. 820 F. Supp. 1169 (D. Minn. 1993).
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workplace surveillance. 14 6 The plaintiff sued for, among other things,
intentional infliction of emotional distress,147 but the court rejected
the claim. The court found that the surveillance mainly focused on
whether the plaintiff was working unrecorded overtime 48 and noted
that the employer did not spy on the plaintiffs private life or any other
matter unrelated to her job.149
Thus, even if an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy
in a particular area, the employee cannot state a claim unless the em-
ployee is viewed engaging in some sort of private activity, and activi-
ties that are work-related are generally not considered private vis-hL-
vis one's employer. For this reason, most employer surveillance of ac-
tivities in the workplace will not be tortious. Of course, there will be
some activities that are work-related that will still be considered pri-
vate. For example, an employee who changes uniforms at work is,
when changing clothes, engaged in a work-related activity, yet no one
would maintain that undressing is not generally a private activity.
There is, however, support for the argument that any activity that
is not exposed to the defendant is automatically considered private.
For example, in Doe v. B.P.S. Guard Services, Inc.,150 the court held
that fashion models had a cause of action against the employer of se-
curity guards when the guards videotaped the models in a dressing
area, even though some of the models could not prove they were video-
taped in a state of undress. 15 1 Prosser as well suggests that the mere
act of conducting surreptitious surveillance of someone in his or her
home would be an invasion of privacy.15 2
If an activity that is not exposed to the defendant is automatically
considered private for purposes of the tort of intrusion, the require-
ment that the activity be private merges with the requirement that it
not be exposed to the defendant. Unfortunately, the law is not clear
on this issue. I propose, however, that like an attempted surveillance,
the consequences of a surveillance when the plaintiff is not engaged in
a particularly private activity (meaning, at least, an activity a reason-
able person would not engage in while in public) are not sufficiently
grave to warrant the cost of official intervention.15 3 Therefore, for
146. Id. at 1182-83.
147. Id. at 1174.
148. Id. at 1183.
149. Id.
150. 945 F.2d 1422 (8th Cir. 1991) (applying Missouri law).
151. Id. at 1427.
152. See Prosser, supra note 59, at 392 (stating that when a person "is merely in the
seclusion of his home, the making of a photograph without his consent is an inva-
sion of a private right, of which he is entitled to complain"). What role the taking
of a photograph plays in Prosser's opinion is unclear.
153. See EISENBERG, supra note 109, at 29 ("The policy of social gravity is that morally
wrongful conduct should not give rise to liability unless its consequences are nor-
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purposes of stating a bright-line rule, I will reject the notion that an
activity is private as long as it is not exposed to the defendant.
2. Activity Free from Exposure to Defendant
The plaintiff must normally expect his or her activity to be free
from exposure to the defendant. 15 4 With respect to this factor, the
courts are in effect applying the "lawful-vantage-point" concept of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which provides that a Fourth
Amendment search does not occur if a law enforcement officer "ob-
serves individuals, objects, or activities in 'plain sight' or 'open view'
from a lawful vantage point."155 Under the lawful-vantage-point con-
cept, surveillance is not tortious if the person conducting the surveil-
lance can see the subject from a location the person has a lawful right
to be. As demonstrated below, treating the employment surveillance
cases as applying the lawful-vantage-point concept explains the deci-
sions involving employers' surreptitious physical surveillance of em-
ployees irrespective of whether the surveillance occurs when the
employee is in public, in the workplace, or in any other location.15 6
mally of sufficient importance, in terms of either the social interests implicated or
the injury likely to result, to justify the social cost of official intervention.").
Again, this is not to say that official intervention might not be warranted under
criminal laws.
154. Snakenberg v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 383 S.E.2d 2, 6 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989). Al-
though a plaintiffs consent to being observed by the defendant ordinarily pre-
cludes a claim, some courts have allowed a claim when the defendant gained
access to the premises through misrepresentation of the defendant's motives or
by failing to disclose a relevant fact that would have resulted in denial of access.
See, e.g., Sanders v. Am. Broad. Cos., 978 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999) (recognizing claim
when undercover news reporter obtained access to workplace by applying for, and
receiving, employment); De May v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146 (Mich. 1881) (recognizing
claim when friend of physician accompanied physician to birth of plaintiffs child,
and friend should have, but did not, disclose to plaintiff that he was not associ-
ated with the medical profession). But see Turner v. Gen. Adjustment Bureau,
Inc., 832 P.2d 62, 67 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (holding that plaintiff failed to state a
claim for invasion of privacy when investigators gained access to home through
fraud), overruled on other grounds by Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.,
65 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2001), rev'd on other grounds, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
155. David S. Rudstein, "Touchy" "Feely"--Is There a Constitutional Difference? The
Constitutionality of "Prepping" a Passenger's Luggage for a Human or Canine
Sniff After Bond v. United States, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 191, 202 (2001).
156. Although the courts have not explained their holdings in terms of the lawful-
vantage-point concept, this makes the interpretation no less valid. See RONALD
DwoR2iN, LAW's EMPIRE 284 (1986) ("[Aln interpretation need not be consistent
with past judicial attitudes or opinions, with how past judges saw what they were
doing, in order to count as an eligible interpretation of what they in fact did.").
Although one court, in a non-employment case, explicitly rejected the lawful-van-
tage-point concept, see West v. Media Gen. Operations, Inc., No. 1:00-CV-184,
2001 WL 34079475, at *12 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 13, 2001) (rejecting defendant's reli-
ance on lawful-vantage-point concept when defendant, while on public property,
videotaped plaintiff on the balcony of a condominium and in the condominium's
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Before analyzing the cases to demonstrate that they are consistent
with the lawful-vantage-point concept, I address various issues involv-
ing the concept.
a. Lawful-Vantage-Point Concept and Trespass
The test, properly defined, is whether the employer could have
viewed the employee from a lawful vantage point, not whether the em-
ployer was in fact at a lawful vantage point. If an employer conducts
surveillance from a location where he or she does not have a legal
right to be, but could have viewed the same activities of the employee
from a lawful vantage point, no claim should be stated. This is demon-
strated by McLain v. Boise Cascade Corp.,157 in which a trespass onto
the periphery of the plaintiffs property to conduct surveillance was
held not to be an invasion of privacy.158 Although the court in Mc-
Lain, in holding that a trespass does not automatically make surveil-
lance an invasion of privacy, relied on the factor that requires the
invasion of privacy to be highly offensive, the decision is more appro-
priately viewed as applying the notion that the lawful-vantage-point
concept extends to surveillance that could have been conducted from
such a vantage point.
In McLain, the plaintiff requested a hearing with a workers' com-
pensation board to have his disability payments reinstated.159 His
employer hired a company to conduct surveillance of the plaintiff to
determine the validity of the plaintiffs claim of injury,160 and the in-
vestigators filmed the plaintiff engaged in various activities on his
property outside his home.161 The plaintiff lived on slightly more
than two acres of land, and some of the footage was taken by the in-
vestigators while on the periphery of the plaintiffs property.162 The
private parking lot), the court erroneously interpreted Evans v. Detlefsen, 857
F.2d 330 (6th Cir. 1988), as having rejected the concept. In Evans, the court held
that the plaintiff could establish a claim when the defendant followed the plain-
tiff to a restaurant and pushed, shoved, and pulled him out of the restaurant. Id.
at 332, 338. The court rejected the defendant's argument that because the inci-
dent occurred in a public restaurant there could be no claim, relying on Galella v.
Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1972). In Onassis, a claim for intrusion existed
when the conduct, which took place in public, included physical touching, causing
fear of physical contact, following the subject too closely in a car, and endanger-
ing the safety of the subject's children while they were swimming. See id. at 994.
Thus, Evans stands simply for the proposition that an intrusion claim can exist
when the defendant's conduct, far from being surreptitious, is physically
harassing.
157. 533 P.2d 343 (Or. 1975).
158. Id. at 346.
159. Id. at 344.





court noted that the "plaintiff conceded that his activities which were
filmed could have been observed by his neighbors or passersby on the
road running in front of his property."163
Although the investigators conducted some of the surveillance on
the plaintiffs property, the court stated that "the trespass was on the
periphery of plaintiffs property and did not constitute an unreasona-
ble surveillance 'highly offensive to a reasonable man."'164 The court
held that "trespass is only one factor to be considered in determining
whether the surveillance was unreasonable. Trespass to peer in win-
dows and to annoy or harass the occupant may be unreasonable. Tres-
pass alone cannot automatically change an otherwise reasonable
surveillance into an unreasonable one."16 5
Professor Matthew Finkin has stated that "trespassing on home or
business property to engage in the surveillance would work an 'unrea-
sonable' intrusion" and "[a] trespass . . . would be impermissible."'16 6
None of the cases relied on by Professor Finkin, however, held that a
trespass to conduct surveillance results in an invasion of privacy even
if the surveillance could have been conducted from a lawful vantage
point.167
The holding in McLain that a trespass is simply a factor to con-
sider (and not dispositive) is correct because, as recognized by Prosser,
the invasion-of-privacy tort based on intrusion "has been useful chiefly
to fill in the gaps left by trespass, nuisance, the intentional infliction
of mental distress, and whatever remedies there may be for the inva-
sion of constitutional rights."168 The view that a trespass automati-
163. Id. at 346.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 347. This is the position adopted in a California statute, which provides
that whether the defendant trespassed is irrelevant if the image could have been
achieved with the naked eye without a trespass. CAL. CiV. CODE § 1708.8(b)
(West 2006).
166. MATHEW W. FINKIN, PRIVACY IN EMPLOYMENT LAw 225 (2d ed. 2003).
167. See id. (citing McLain, which rejected such a notion; Love v. Southern Bell Tele-
phone & Telegraph Co., 263 So. 2d 460 (La. Ct. App. 1972), which involved sur-
veillance of the employee inside his home; and Ford Motor Co. v. Williams, 134
S.E.2d 32 (Ga. 1963), which involved intrusion inside an employee's home and
dealt solely with the issue of respondeat superior). Although not relied on by Pro-
fessor Finkin, the decision in Association Services, Inc. v. Smith, 549 S.E.2d 454
(Ga. Ct. App. 2001), comes the closest to supporting his argument. In Smith, the
court held that it was a question for the jury as to whether an invasion-of-privacy
claim existed when the investigator might have trespassed on the plaintiffs pri-
vate property and at her workplace to conduct the surveillance. Id. at 549. There
was, however, evidence that the same surveillance (at least with respect to the
surveillance from the plaintiffs private property) could not have been obtained
from a lawful vantage point. Id. at 459, 461. The court did not indicate whether
the footage in the workplace could not have been obtained from a lawful vantage
point.
168. See Prosser, supra note 59, at 392.
[Vol. 85:212
LOOKING OUT FOR YOUR EMPLOYEES
cally renders the surveillance an invasion of privacy results in an
unnecessary duplicative remedy, which is inconsistent with the use of
the invasion-of-privacy tort as a gap filler. If there has been a tres-
pass, then a cause of action for trespass can be asserted and recovery
obtained. Trespassing should only be relevant if it allows the person
conducting the surveillance to view the employee in a manner that the
person would not otherwise be able to view the employee. 16 9 Thus, a
trespass would be irrelevant (at least to an invasion-of-privacy claim)
if the employer could have seen the same events from a lawful vantage
point.
Also, the view that a trespass automatically makes the surveil-
lance an invasion of privacy is based on the use of a derivative or weak
sense of privacy;170 one is employing the meaning that relates to phys-
ical exclusiveness.171 As recognized by Professor Hyman Gross, in-
jury to what is designated by privacy in this weak sense is, however,
"met in the law" with the remedies to trespass. 17 2
169. Thus, if the employer trespasses on the employee's property to peer through the
windows of the employee's home when a view of the inside of the home could not
be had from a lawful vantage point, the trespass would be relevant. This follows
from the fact that it is reasonable (if one desires to employ such terminology) for a
person to not expect the defendant to trespass on his or her property, and thus
reasonable for such person to believe he or she was not exposing his or her activi-
ties to the defendant. A more difficult issue involves the defendant trespassing
onto a third person's property to view the plaintiff. Although it is reasonable to
not expect the defendant to trespass on another's property, if your neighbor can
view your activities, it would be difficult to argue you have a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in those activities. However, the concept of "group privacy" or
.selective disclosure," which is discussed later, might be applicable, particularly if
you knew your neighbors and were friends with them.
170. Hyman Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 34, 36-37 (1967). Pro-
fessor Gross identifies four different sorts of states that are sometimes desig-
nated as privacy, which are best viewed as a derivative or weak sense of the
word: (1) mental repose; (2) physical solitude; (3) physical exclusiveness; and (4)
autonomy. Id. at 37-38. Professor Gross explains how persons come to often as-
sociate these four weak senses of the word with the strong sense of the word. Id.
at 39. For example, "privacy, in a given situation, may depend upon physical
solitude, or mental repose, or physical exclusiveness, or autonomy." Id. Profes-
sor Gross provides the following example:
[A] person might secure his privacy by occupying a castle or, in other
words, he has secured his privacy through physical solitude and physical
exclusiveness. This does not mean, however, that an invasion of such
person's physical exclusiveness, say, by obtaining a key to the castle,
means that the person's privacy has been invaded, at least not when em-
ploying the strong sense of privacy.
Id.
171. Id. at 37.
172. Id. at 38.
2006]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
b. Lawful-Vantage-Point Concept and Selective Disclosure
A person does not lose his or her right to privacy merely because
some persons are able to view him or her from a lawful vantage point.
The test is whether the plaintiffs activities are free from exposure to
the defendant.
For example, in Huskey v. National Broadcasting Co.,173 the plain-
tiff, who was a prisoner, sued NBC for videotaping him while he was
in the prison's exercise cage, even though other prisoners and a guard
could view him.17 4 The court rejected NBC's argument that the plain-
tiffs visibility to other prisoners and a guard defeated his claim: "[The
plaintiffs] visibility to some people does not strip him of the right to
remain secluded from others. Persons are exposed to family members
and invited guests in their own homes, but that does not mean they
have opened the door to television cameras."175
Similarly, in another non-employment case, a woman sued the de-
fendant for being an uninvited spectator at the birth of her child,176
even though other persons were present with her permission. The
court held that a claim existed against the uninvited spectator, stating
that "[t]o the plaintiff the occasion was a most sacred one and no one
had a right to intrude unless invited or because of some real and
pressing necessity."177
The concept that the subject need not be alone is important be-
cause if the presence of any other person (such as a coworker) auto-
matically defeats a claim for invasion of privacy based on surveillance,
the subject would have to be alone to state a claim. If this were the
law, it would not be an invasion of privacy to conduct surreptitious
surveillance of an employee engaged in intimate activities in his or
her home as long as the employee was with his or her spouse, and it
would also not be an invasion of privacy for a male supervisor to con-
duct surreptitious surveillance of a female employee in a women's
dressing room if other female workers were present in the room. This
cannot be the law.
Professor Lyrissa Lidsky has offered a persuasive rationale for the
concept that a person who is not alone can still state a claim for inva-
sion of privacy based on surveillance.178 Although Professor Lidsky's
173. 632 F. Supp. 1282 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
174. Id. at 1285.
175. Id. at 1288.
176. De May v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146, 146 (Mich. 1881).
177. Id. at 149. For an extensive discussion of the group privacy or selective-disclo-
sure doctrine, see Sanders v. American Broadcasting Cos., 978 P.2d 67, 71-77
(Cal. 1999).
178. Professor's Lidsky's rationale appears consistent with the reasoning employed by
the court in Huskey.
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discussion addressed photographs, her rationale is applicable to any
surveillance. She asserts that photographing
creates the potential that the subject's actions will be exposed to a completely
different audience than the one she intended or expected. Individuals typi-
cally tailor their behavior to the expected audience, and by denying individu-
als this opportunity, the defendant violates both their expectations of
anonymity and their autonomy in selecting to whom they will reveal parts of
themselves.
1 7 9
This concept, known as "group privacy" or "selective disclosure," recog-
nizes "that individuals want to keep things private from some people
but not others."1 8 0
When, however, the plaintiff makes the disclosure to a person with
whom the plaintiff has no relationship of trust (which is more likely to
occur the larger the group to which the disclosure is made), the disclo-
sure cannot be considered "selective." In such a case, a defendant who
was not at a lawful vantage point can step into the shoes of a person
who was. In other words, the plaintiff can only take advantage of the
selective-disclosure concept if the disclosure is truly selective. For ex-
ample, if the plaintiff is willing to engage in particular activities at a
party with many guests, the selective-disclosure concept will not apply
unless the plaintiff can demonstrate he or she had some reason to be-
lieve none of the guests would disclose what they saw. Presumably,
though, the selective-disclosure doctrine will apply to undressing in
front of others, irrespective of who the others are, as long as the group
is limited to persons of the plaintiffs gender. It is also important to
recognize that this Article does not address the dissemination of pri-
vate facts or pictures, which might be tortious even if the defendant's
surveillance was not.
c. Lawful-Vantage-Point Concept and Activities in Public
The lawful-vantage-point concept is most commonly employed with
respect to surveillance of persons in public. Therefore, "[a]s inter-
preted by almost all courts, the tort does not protect persons in places
accessible to the public," and "tort law currently provides little protec-
tion from intrusive videotaping, photography, or surveillance, so long
as the activity occurs in a public place." i 18 The Restatement explains
as follows:
179. Lyrissa B. Lidsky, Prying, Spying, and Lying: Intrusive Newsgathering and What
the Law Should Do About It, 73 TUL. L. REV. 173, 237 (1998).
180. Solove, supra note 132, at 1108. It has also been argued that "privacy" and "se-
crecy" are not interchangeable, the former concept being broader than the latter;
thus, something can be "private" even if not "secret." See SISSELA BOK, SECRETS
10-11 (1982), discussed in John D. Blackburn, Elliot I. Klayman & Richard 0.
Nathan, Invasion of Privacy: Refocusing the Tort in Private Sector Employment, 6
DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 41, 46 n.15 (1993).
181. McClurg, supra note 74, at 991-92.
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The defendant is subject to liability under the rule stated in this Section only
when he has intruded into a private place, or has otherwise invaded a private
seclusion that the plaintiff has thrown about his person or affairs. Thus there
is no liability ... for observing him or even taking his photograph while he is
walking on the public highway, since he is not then in seclusion, and his ap-
pearance is public and open to the public eye.
1 8 2
The Restatement provides the following example: "A is drunk on the
public street. B takes his photograph in that condition. B has not in-
vaded A's privacy."1 8 3
As noted by Professor Andrew McClurg, "The steadfastness with
which courts have clung to the rule that what occurs in public cannot
be private traditionally has meant that most instances of public intru-
sion do not result in litigation. When they do, the plaintiffs lose early
and often."18 4 The most likely explanation for the court's steadfast
refusal to allow invasion-of-privacy claims involving surveillance of a
subject in public is because of the difficulty and uncertainty that
would be entailed in determining when a person has a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in such a situation.185 The rule regarding public
activities has the benefit of being predictable. 8 6
d. Empirical Versus Normative Concept
Is, however, the lawful-vantage-point concept as broad as it ap-
pears? Does conducting surveillance from any lawful vantage point
automatically preclude liability? What if it is uncommon for persons
to be at that particular vantage point (surely it was unusual for per-
sons to stop on the shoulder of the road near where Jones lived), lead-
ing the subject to reasonably believe no one is watching? What if an
employee believes he or she is alone in a workplace office?
This issue reveals two different methods of analyzing invasion-of-
privacy claims: an empirical approach and a normative approach.
Under the empirical approach, an employee must have had a "reason-
able" expectation of privacy, with an expectation being reasonable as
long as his or "her belief or expectation is one that an ordinary person
would possess."' 8 7 As explained by Professor Joshua Dressler with
respect to the Fourth Amendment:
182. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (1977).
183. Id. illus. 6.
184. McClurg, supra note 74, at 992.
185. For example, Professor Lidsky has argued that "many courts have abdicated re-
sponsibility for protecting individuals from intrusions in public places," and has
suggested that the reason is because such intrusions pose a harder question to
resolve. Lidsky, supra note 179, at 244.
186. See, e.g., id. at 234 (acknowledging that a "rights-based approach to intrusion
cases [premised on trespass] would provide needed certainty," but criticizing such
an approach for other reasons).
187. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 101 (3d ed. 2002).
Under either an empirical approach or a normative approach, the employee must
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In the privacy context, [applying this standard] would mean that an expecta-
tion of privacy is "reasonable" when a reasonable person would not expect that
her privacy is at serious risk. So understood, "reasonableness" contains a sig-
nificant empirical component, a "matter[] of statistical probability," e.g., how
likely is it that there will be a privacy incursion.188
Under the normative approach, the employee must have a "legiti-
mate" or "justifiable" expectation of privacy, which involves drawing
"a normative conclusion-a value judgment-that she has a right to
that expectation."189 Under this approach, the privacy protected "is
not the privacy that one reasonably expects but the privacy to which
one has a right."'190
The difference between the two methods is significant. A privacy
expectation could be reasonable in the sense that an ordinary person
would believe his or her activities were not at serious risk of being
viewed by the defendant (perhaps a standard that could have been
satisfied by Jones or an employee who believes he or she is alone), yet
not be legitimate or justifiable from a normative standpoint.191
To demonstrate the difference between the two methods, Professor
Dressler, discussing the Fourth Amendment, provides the following
example of when an expectation of privacy might be reasonable, but
not legitimate or justifiable:
[Sluppose that [a defendant] commits a crime in a secluded spot in a park
during the middle of the night after carefully ascertaining that the area is
frequented at that hour only once every 672 days. Based on this information,
[the defendant] expects that her actions will not be observed. That expecta-
tion might be "reasonable" in the sense that most persons would expect, as a
matter of statistical probability, to be free from observation. Nonetheless, if a
police officer happened by and observed the criminal conduct, commentators
would likely agree . . . that [the defendant's] subjective privacy expectation
should not be protected. This is because [the defendant's] expectations, al-
though perhaps "reasonable," were "unjustifiable" or "illegitimate." That is,
as a normative matter, people have no right to expect privacy if they conduct
activities in the open, no matter how unlikely it is that they will be discovered
on any given occasion.192
Conversely, a person might reasonably believe his or her activities
are at serious risk of being observed, yet still have a legitimate or jus-
tifiable expectation of privacy. For example, a person might have a
legitimate or justifiable expectation of privacy in his or her backyard
at least have "an actual, subjective expectation of seclusion or solitude in the
place." Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Cos., 306 F.3d 806, 812 (9th
Cir. 2002).
188. DRESSLER, supra note 187, at 101 (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amend-
ment Today: A Bicentennial Appraisal, 32 VILL. L. REV. 1061, 1081 (1987)).
189. Id. at 101-02.
190. Id. at 102 (quoting State v. Campbell, 759 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Or. 1988)).
191. Id.
192. Id. (footnote omitted). See also WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE




even if "police helicopters routinely hover at a very low altitude over
the backyards of homes scanning the area."19 3
In the Fourth Amendment context, the Supreme Court's approach
to the issue of whether the expectation of privacy analysis is empirical
or normative has been described as "mixed."194 "The Court seems to
indiscriminately waffle between phrasing the requirement as a 'rea-
sonable' expectation of privacy and a 'legitimate' expectation of pri-
vacy, leaving uncertain whether the test is meant to be empirical, as
suggested by the former term, or normative, as suggested by the lat-
ter."19 5 When, however, the Court has relied on an empirical ap-
proach, it has done so to conclude that the defendant did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy. 196 In fact, three leading commenta-
tors have suggested that the test applied by the Court requires that
both the normative approach and the empirical approach be
satisfied.197
Cases involving employers' surreptitious surveillance of employees
and the tort of invasion of privacy also suggest that courts require
plaintiffs to satisfy both the normative and empirical approaches.
With respect to applying a normative approach, courts have rejected
claims when the employee could be viewed by the employer from a
lawful vantage point, even if the employee perhaps reasonably be-
lieved his or her privacy was not at serious risk. For example, in
I. C. U. Investigations, Inc. v. Jones,198 although Jones was aware sur-
veillance might be conducted, he most likely believed his privacy was
not at serious risk when he urinated in his front yard. Notwithstand-
ing, the court held there was no cause of action because he engaged in
such activities from a location visible to the public.199 Similarly, in
Salazar v. Golden State Warriors,200 the court rejected an invasion-of-
193. DRESSLER, supra note 187, at 102.
194. Id. at 103.
195. Stephen E. Henderson, Nothing New Under the Sun? A Technologically Rational
Doctrine of Fourth Amendment Search, 56 MERCER L. REV. 507, 517 n.54 (2005).
196. See Barbara J. Flagg, The Algebra of Pluralism: Subjective Experience as a Con-
stitutional Variable, 47 VAND. L. REV. 273, 296 (1994) ("[Tlhe Supreme Court re-
peatedly has found it appropriate to appeal to a notion of empirical
reasonableness to defeat claims to Fourth Amendment protection.").
197. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 192, § 3.2, at 129 ("[Flor an expectation to be con-
sidered justified it is not sufficient that it be merely reasonable; something in
addition is required.").
198. 780 So. 2d 685 (Ala. 2000).
199. Id. at 689-90. Justice Cook, dissenting in Jones, essentially employed an empiri-
cal analysis to conclude that the jury was entitled to find that Jones retained a
right to privacy, even though he was in his front yard and visible to the public.
Justice Cook concluded that Jones's distances from the highway and the layout of
his property created a disputed issue as to whether his activities were "public."
Id. at 690 (Cook, J., dissenting).
200. No. C-99-4825 CRB, 2000 WL 246586 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2000).
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privacy claim even though the employee was in his vehicle in a dark
parking lot.201
Courts, however, have also occasionally, when finding surveillance
not tortious from a lawful vantage point, pointed out that the em-
ployee should have realized his or her privacy was at serious risk be-
cause he or she filed a legal claim that might prompt the employer to
conduct surveillance. 2 02 This suggests the empirical approach applies
in addition to the normative approach. The empirical approach will
therefore preclude liability when a reasonable employee would have
known his or her activities were at serious risk of exposure, presuma-
bly even if the employer's surveillance was not from a lawful vantage
point. Although there perhaps should be limits to the application of
the empirical approach in non-employment contexts, such as when the
government conducts surveillance of citizens (because otherwise the
defendant could avoid liability by simply telling the plaintiff the sur-
veillance would be conducted), the use of the empirical approach is
suitable in the employment context because the employee can quit in
lieu of having his or her privacy put at risk. Also, an employee who
continues to work, despite knowing his or her privacy is at serious
risk, not only lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy, but as dis-
cussed later, has perhaps contractually agreed or given apparent con-
sent to such surveillance.
e. A Limitation on the Lawful-Vantage-Point Concept
There must, however, be a limitation on the lawful-vantage-point
concept, and an easy example demonstrates this. Suppose a person
drills a hole in the wall of a women's public restroom which enables
anyone looking through the hole to view the women inside. A person
can look through the hole while standing on public property. If the
lawful-vantage-point concept applied, it would not be an invasion of
privacy for anyone to look through the hole because such person would
be able to see the women from a lawful vantage point. Everyone
would agree, however, that the women's expectations of privacy are
legitimate and justifiable from a normative standpoint, and reasona-
ble from an empirical standpoint (assuming the subject did not know
about the hole), and that there has been an invasion of privacy. What
201. Id. at *1-4.
202. See, e.g., Jones, 780 So. 2d at 689 (noting that employee who filed workers' com-
pensation claim should have expected "reasonable investigation regarding his
physical capacity"); Johnson v. Corporate Special Servs., Inc., 602 So. 2d 385, 388
(Ala. 1992) (noting that employee who filed workers' compensation claim "should
have expected a reasonable amount of investigation into his physical incapabil-
ity"); McLain v. Boise Cascade Corp., 533 P.2d 343, 346 (Or. 1975) ("It is also well
established that one who seeks to recover damages for alleged injuries must ex-
pect that his claim will be investigated and he waives his right to privacy to the
extent of a reasonable investigation.").
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then, is the qualification to the lawful-vantage-point concept applied
in such a case?
It is this: The defendant loses the right to rely on the lawful-van-
tage-point concept if he or she engages in conduct to obtain a view of
the plaintiff that could not ordinarily be had from a lawful vantage
point. An example would be taking an unusual action to circumvent a
barrier precluding observation (such as placing a video camera in the
ceiling, looking through a hole in a wall the subject reasonably is not
aware of, or standing on a ladder). This is a necessary limitation on
the lawful-vantage-point concept to ensure it does not defeat claims
most everyone would agree should be recognized.
f. Photographs and Vision-Enhancing Equipment
The lawful-vantage-point concept applies even if the defendant
takes a photograph or uses a video camera.2 03 For example, one court
stated that "it is of no moment whether the observation of openly dis-
played facts is accomplished by a video camera or the naked eye."20 4
An important issue, however, is whether the lawful-vantage-point
concept applies only to what can be seen with the naked eye, or
whether it also applies to subjects and activities that can be seen only
with image-enhancing equipment.2 0 5
To date, courts have been unwilling to limit the lawful-vantage-
point concept to that which can be seen with the naked eye. For exam-
ple, in Jones, on only one of the four occasions on which Jones was
caught on videotape urinating did the investigator suspect this was
what he was doing.206 The specifics of Jones's activities were revealed
through the use of a telephoto lens.207 Notwithstanding, the court re-
jected Jones's invasion-of-privacy claim 208 (though one dissenting jus-
203. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (1977) (stating it is not an
invasion of privacy to take a picture of a person who is in public).
204. Acosta v. Scott Labor LLC, 377 F. Supp. 2d 647, 650 (N.D. Ill. 2005). Some com-
mentators, however, have argued that filming, taping, or recording the subject is
more intrusive than the mere use of the naked eye. See, e.g., Lidsky, supra note
179, at 237 ("[F]ilming, taping, or recording a target is potentially more intrusive
than mere observation .... [Pihotographing someone's activities is more intru-
sive than simple observation because once a permanent record is created, the
subject is at the mercy of the person who holds the photograph."). Professor Lid-
sky's concern, however, is with respect to dissemination of the recording or
photograph.
205. A commentator has argued that the increasing sophistication of technology is
particularly threatening to employees' sense of privacy: "As technology grows in
sophistication, the danger to employees' privacy interest heightens; such technol-
ogy's proliferation generates a deep-seated disquietude concerning the privacy
rights of employees." Cavico, supra note 33, at 1266.
206. Jones, 780 So. 2d at 687.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 689-90.
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tice believed the use of the telephoto lens was sufficient to establish a
claim).20 9 Similarly, in Salazar v. Golden State Warriors,2 10 the court
rejected an invasion-of-privacy claim even though the investigator
used a night vision, infrared, high-powered scoping device to take foot-
age of an employee using drugs in his sports utility vehicle in a dark
parking lot.211
At least two courts, however, have stated that there might be a
limit to the use of image-enhancing equipment to conduct surveillance
of an employee. In Saldana v. Kelsey-Hayes Co. ,212 a case involving
surveillance of an employee suspected of malingering, the court stated
that "the use of a powerful lens to observe the interior of a home ...
could be found to be objectionable to a reasonable person."2 13 Simi-
larly, in Digirolamo v. D.P. Anderson & Associates, Inc.,214 the court
indicated, in dicta, that the lawful-vantage-point concept does not ap-
ply to the use of image-enhancing equipment to view an employee who
is inside his or her home, relying on Fourth Amendment case law. 2 15
Likewise, the Restatement indicates that using binoculars or a tele-
scope to see into an upstairs home window would be an invasion of
privacy.2 16 Thus, the use of vision-enhancing equipment to see inside
one's home, when the same activities could not have been viewed with
the naked eye, might be tortious. If such conduct is tortious, this ex-
ception to the general rule that the use of image-enhancing equipment
does not affect the lawful-vantage-point concept is best viewed as a
limitation based on the increased privacy protection provided to activi-
ties in one's home.
g. The "Public-Place/Private-Matter" Exception
The proper scope of a limitation on the lawful-vantage-point con-
cept that has been suggested by the Restatement should be addressed.
The exception, known as the "public-place/private-matter" exception,
has been explained as follows: "Even in a public place... there may be
some matters about the plaintiff, such as his underwear or lack of it,
that are not exhibited to the public gaze; and there may still be inva-
sion of privacy when there is intrusion upon these matters."2 17 The
Restatement provides the following example of the public-place/pri-
vate-matter exception:
209. Id. at 693 (Johnstone, J., dissenting).
210. No. C-99-4825 CRB, 2000 WL 246586 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2000).
211. Id. at *1-4.
212. 443 N.W.2d 382 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
213. Id. at 384.
214. No. Civ. A. 97-3623, 1999 WL 345592 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 26, 1999).
215. Id. at *3-4.
216. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b, illus. 2 (1977).
217. Id. cmt. c.
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A, a young woman, attends a "Fun House," a public place of amusement where
various tricks are played upon visitors. While she is there a concealed jet of
compressed air blows her skirts over her head, and reveals her underwear. B
takes a photograph of her in that position. B has invaded A's privacy.2 1 8
This was the exception relied on by one of the dissenting justices in
I. C.U. Investigations, Inc. v. Jones in concluding that an invasion of
privacy occurred because, in his opinion, Jones's act of urinating was
"not exhibited to the public gaze." 2 1 9
There are important limits to this exception, however, that are not
readily apparent from the Restatement and which led the dissenting
justice in Jones to erroneously rely on the exception. First, a careful
reading of the Restatement and the case upon which the exception is
based shows that the exception does not apply to viewing intentional
conduct (such as Jones urinating). As previously discussed, an exam-
ple provided by the Restatement of a situation that would not consti-
tute an invasion of privacy is taking a picture of a drunk person in
that condition on a public street. 22 0 The apparent distinction between
taking a picture of the woman with her skirt blown over her head (an
invasion of privacy) and taking a picture of a person in a drunken
state on a public street (not an invasion of privacy) is that the wo-
man's embarrassing position was unintentional and occurred through
no fault of her own (the jet of compressed air was concealed), whereas
the drunk person's state was (presumably) the result of his own in-
tent, recklessness, or negligence.
This distinction is confirmed by the case on which the public-place/
private-matter exception (and the "fun house" example in the Restate-
ment) is based-Daily Times Democrat v. Graham.2 2 1 A review of
Graham shows that it was important that the plaintiffs embarrassing
position was involuntary. The court stated that "[t]o hold that one
who is involuntarily and instantaneously enmeshed in an embarrass-
ing pose forfeits her right of privacy merely because she happened at
that moment to be part of a public scene would be illogical, wrong, and
unjust."222 At a later point in its opinion, the court again emphasized
the involuntary nature of the plaintiffs position:
One who is a part of a public scene may be lawfully photographed as an inci-
dental part of that scene in his ordinary status. Where the status he expects
to occupy is changed without his volition to a status embarrassing to an ordi-
nary person of reasonable sensitivity, then he should not be deemed to have
218. Id. illus. 7.
219. 780 So. 2d 685, 693 (Ala. 2000) (England, J., dissenting) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
220. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B illus. 6 (1977).
221. 162 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1964). Interestingly, Graham, like Jones, was decided by the
Alabama Supreme Court. In Jones, however, Justice England relied solely on the
Restatement for a discussion of the exception and did not discuss or even cite to
Graham. Jones, 780 So. 2d at 692-93 (England, J., dissenting).
222. Graham, 162 So. 2d at 478.
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forfeited his right to be protected from an indecent and vulgar intrusion of his
right of privacy merely because misfortune overtakes him in a public place. 2 2 3
Thus, as demonstrated by Graham, the public-place/private-matter
exception applies only when the defendant knows (or perhaps should
have known) that the plaintiffs public disclosure of the private matter
was involuntary. Hence, the exception had no application to Jones's
act of urination.
Second, and more importantly, a review of Graham demonstrates
that it was not the viewing of the plaintiff in her embarrassing posi-
tion, or even the taking of her photograph, that was tortious; it was
the defendant's publication of the picture on the front page of its news-
paper. The court quoted Prosser for the proposition that "there must
be yet some undefined limits of common decency as to what can be
published about anyone; and that a photograph of indecent exposure,
for example, can never be legitimate 'news.'"224 The court also quoted
the Restatement's assertion that an invasion of privacy occurs "where
photographs of a person in an embarrassing pose are surreptitiously
taken and published."225
Thus, the public-place/private-matter exception does not apply to
viewing, or even taking a picture of, a person in public who is involun-
tarily put in an embarrassing position. Rather, the exception prohib-
its publicizing a photograph of the incident. The mere act of taking a
picture is properly not considered tortious because taking a picture of
an incident for one's own use (without giving it publicity) is not signifi-
cantly different from maintaining the mental impression of the scene
or even sketching the scene afterwards (for one's own use). To hold
otherwise would lead to the absurd result that persons must turn
away from an embarrassing scene even though the viewer is at a law-
ful vantage point (though prolonged viewing might be tortious).
Therefore, the mere act of viewing Jones urinating could not have
fallen within the public-place/private-matter exception; only publiciz-
ing the videotape could have been tortious under the exception.
h. Employee Consent
An important issue, though largely unexplored by the courts, in-
volves an employee's purported consent to surreptitious surveillance.
For example, does the employee not have a claim if he or she had been
told by his or her employer that the company had the right to conduct
otherwise tortious surveillance? The issue is difficult because the le-
gal doctrines or concepts involved are unclear. The issue can be seen
as one of consent, waiver, agreement, not having a reasonable expec-
223. Id. (emphasis added).
224. Id. at 477 (emphasis added) (quoting Prosser, supra note 59, at 416 & n.270).




tation of privacy, or as knowingly exposing one's activities to the de-
fendant's view (which is why I discuss the issue in this section).2 26
Under an empirical approach to privacy, which courts in employ-
ment surveillance cases seem to apply in addition to a normative ap-
proach, the critical issue is whether a reasonable employee would
have considered his or her activities at significant risk of exposure. If
an employee knows the employer actually engages in surreptitious
surveillance, or the employer sufficiently emphasizes its right to con-
duct such surveillance (by perhaps, disseminating a surveillance pol-
226. For example, under such circumstances, it can be argued that the employee does
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, consents to the surveillance (the
strongest case for consent applying to those situations in which the surveillance
takes place at work and the employee remains on the job despite being aware of
the potential surveillance), or waives any claim. See Black v. City & County of
Honolulu, 112 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1053 (D. Haw. 2000) ("The right to privacy may
be waived or lost through a course of conduct estopping its assertion if the com-
plaining party displays a clear, unequivocal, and decisive act of waiver."); Ali v.
Douglas Cable Commc'ns, 929 F. Supp. 1362, 1382 (D. Kan. 1996) (holding that
plaintiffs failed to state claim for invasion of privacy when employer advised em-
ployees that telephones were for business purposes and would be monitored);
Jackson v. Nationwide Credit, Inc., 426 S.E.2d 630, 632 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (hold-
ing it was not an invasion of privacy for employer to monitor employees' tele-
phones because "[a]ll employees were advised that the telephones were for
business only and that the telephones would be monitored"); Baxi & Nickel, supra
note 36, at 143 ("An employer may use the defense[ ] of consent ... against an
employee's privacy-based tort claim. Consent is a defense if the employee ex-
pressly or impliedly consented to the invasion." (footnote omitted)); Blackburn,
Klayman & Nathan, supra note 180, at 55 ("An absolute privilege exists where an
employee consents to an invasion of privacy."); Cavico, supra note 33, at 1287 ("If
an employer notifies employees of its surveillance policies, displays copies of the
policies and follows them closely, and explicitly informs employees that surveil-
lance may occur without their knowledge, employees' reasonable expectations of
privacy are considerably lower."); Kray & Robertson, supra note 32, at 144
("[Where the employer gives notice that monitoring will occur in a reasonably
intrusive manner for a business concern, the employee cannot have a reasonable
expectation of privacy. Notice defines what the employer expects to be private
and allows the employee either to seek alternative employment or implicitly con-
sent to reasonable monitoring by continuing employment, thus negating the em-
ployee's expectation of privacy."); Post, supra note 57, at 974 ("Some norms, like
those prohibiting murder, cannot be waived by the consent of individuals. But
the norms policed by the intrusion tort are different. They mark the boundaries
that distinguish respect from intimacy, and their very ability to serve this func-
tion depends upon their capacity for being enforced or waived in appropriate cir-
cumstances. In the power to make such personal choices inheres the very essence
of the independent self."); Lawrence E. Rothstein, Privacy or Dignity?: Electronic
Monitoring in the Workplace, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 379, 405-06
(2000) ("The employer may unilaterally change the employee's expectation of pri-
vacy by instituting a policy of intrusion or by simply intruding on one or more
occasions .... The employee consents to any intrusions by remaining at work
after becoming aware of the intrusion or the possibility of such an intrusion....
[Ain at-will employee who objects to the intrusion or the policies allowing them
may be immediately dismissed.").
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icy), an employee would not have a claim if such actions by the
employer would lead a reasonable employee to know his or her other-
wise private activities are at significant risk of being exposed to the
employer. Though, even with a general surveillance policy that is ade-
quately emphasized, surveillance in a location like a restroom stall
would most likely not defeat a claim under an empirical approach be-
cause, even with the policy, a reasonable employee might not believe
his or her activities in the bathroom stall were at serious risk of being
exposed to the employer. A general statement that the employer has
the right to conduct surreptitious surveillance of an employee at any
location would probably not make unreasonable an employee's expec-
tation to not be viewed in a bathroom stall. An employer could, how-
ever, potentially defeat a claim by issuing a policy clearly indicating
surveillance will take place within bathroom stalls. Under the empiri-
cal approach, the question would be whether the employee reasonably
believed his or her activities were therefore at serious risk of exposure.
Under a normative approach, courts will have to decide whether
the right to be free from observation is legitimate or justifiable if an
employer disseminates a policy indicating it reserves the right to con-
duct surreptitious surveillance. Under this approach, a court might
well hold that from a normative standpoint, a policy reserving the
right to conduct surveillance makes an expectation of privacy illegiti-
mate or unjustifiable even though a reasonable employee would not
believe his or her activities are at significant risk of exposure.
Presuming, however, that an employee has a reasonable expectation
of privacy from an empirical standpoint, courts might be reluctant to
find that a policy permitting surveillance makes an employee's expec-
tation illegitimate or unjustified in all cases. For example, under a
normative approach, an employee would most likely have a legitimate
or justifiable expectation of privacy in a restroom stall irrespective of a
company policy permitting surveillance, if the policy is not sufficiently
specific. 2 27 A policy that clearly indicates such surveillance will occur,
however, might make the employee's expectation of privacy illegiti-
mate or unjustifiable.
This issue is complicated by the nature of an employment relation-
ship, which brings into play notions of contract and consent. If an em-
ployer's right to conduct surveillance is considered a term of
employment, the employee has agreed to the surveillance in return for
227. Professor Wilborn has argued that conducting surveillance of employees in the
restroom is so offensive that even notice to the employees of such surveillance
should not defeat a claim. See Wilborn, supra note 28, at 853 ('Merely providing
notice to employees does not adequately protect their privacy interests. For ex-
ample, an employer may notify an employee that it will monitor employee
restrooms. Knowing that the restrooms are monitored does not decrease the em-
ployee's privacy interest when he uses the bathroom.").
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being employed, and an expectation of privacy in this situation cannot
be considered legitimate or justifiable. This would include a situation
in which an employee handbook or a policy manual (which includes a
surveillance policy) is considered a binding contract under the law of
the applicable state. When the employer and the employee have
agreed (as that term is used in contract law) that the employer has the
right to conduct surreptitious surveillance, the employer's right to
conduct the surveillance is part of the bargain struck between the em-
ployer and the employee, and no claim should be stated, unless the
contractual provision can be avoided by the employee through poten-
tially applicable contract defenses (such as fraud, mistake, duress, or
perhaps even on the grounds such a provision is void as against public
policy).
Also, even if an employer is not deemed to have a contractual right
to conduct surveillance, the issuance of a surveillance policy, coupled
with the employee continuing to work after its issuance, might be con-
sidered to be consent to the surveillance, and consent precludes recov-
ery. 2 2 8 Importantly, although consent is generally defined as a
"willingness in fact for conduct to occur,"229 "[i]f words or conduct are
reasonably understood by another to be intended as consent, they con-
stitute apparent consent and are as effective as consent in fact."2 30
Thus, if an employer reasonably understands the employee's decision
to work after issuance of a surveillance policy as consent to the sur-
veillance, no claim should be stated.
i. The Lawful-Vantage-Point Concept Stated as a Rule
Based on the above discussion, we can restate the lawful-vantage-
point concept as follows (in terms of employers and employees): An
employer may conduct physical surveillance of an employee, including
surveillance with the use of image-enhancing equipment (except, per-
haps, when image-enhancing equipment is used to view activities of
the employee in his or her home if such activities could not be viewed
with the naked eye), without being liable for an invasion of privacy, as
long as (1) the employee's activities could be seen by the employer
(with or without the use of image-enhancing equipment) from a place
the employer had the right to be, (2) unless the employer engages in
conduct to obtain a view of the employee that could not ordinarily be
had from a lawful vantage point. I will now turn to cases involving
employers' surreptitious physical surveillance of employees to deter-
mine whether the discussion above of the lawful-vantage-point con-
cept is consistent with the courts' holdings.
228. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A(1) (1979).
229. Id. § 892(1).
230. Id. § 892(2).
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j. Application of the Lawful-Vantage-Point Concept to
Employers' Surreptitious Physical Surveillance of
Employees
An analysis of case law dealing with employers' surreptitious phys-
ical surveillance of employees demonstrates that the lawful-vantage-
point concept, as described above, is fully applicable to such cases.
The easiest cases deal with an employer's surreptitious physical sur-
veillance conducted from public property, or property to which the
public is invited. Courts have routinely rejected claims that such sur-
veillance is an invasion of the employee's privacy. 2 3 1
As previously discussed, because any person has the right to be in
public, an employee cannot assert a right-to-privacy claim based on
his or her activities that can be viewed from such a location. Accord-
ingly, "employees observed or photographed while on a public street
231. Runson v. Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 969 F.2d 266, 268, 271 (7th Cir. 1992)
(applying Wisconsin law and affirming trial court's finding that invasion-of-pri-
vacy claim was frivolous when defendant monitored plaintiffs morning and after-
noon commuting patterns as well as his residences, stating that the "safety aids
who conducted the surveillance never trespassed onto [the principal's] private
property and operated only from areas designated as public streets or highways");
Stonum v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 2d 894, 896-97, 906 (S.D. Ohio 1999)
(finding no invasion of privacy when defendant photographed plaintiff, who was
suspected of abusing family and medical leave, engaging in various activities in
"plain view of the public eye"); Fayard v. Guardsmark, Inc., Civ. A. No. 89-0108,
1989 WL 145958, at *1-2 (E.D. La. Nov. 29, 1989) (rejecting invasion-of-privacy
claim when employer, who suspected employee of fraternizing with an employee
at the refinery where she was assigned, watched her house and ran license
checks on cars that came and went from her house because the activities were
"entirely open for public viewing"); Int'l Union v. Garner, 601 F. Supp. 187,
191-92 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (holding that no claim was stated when employer re-
corded license tag numbers of persons attending union meeting held at public
place); Fiorillo v. Berkley Adm'rs, No. CV010458400S, 2004 WL 1153678, at *1, 4
(Conn. Super. Ct. May 5, 2004) (finding no invasion of privacy when defendant
viewed plaintiff, who had filed workers' compensation claim, "driving and walk-
ing on public streets, [taking] children to and from school, [traveling] to and from
church and shopping at public businesses" because surveillance was limited to
acts in public); Ellenberg v. Pinkerton's, Inc., 202 S.E.2d 701 (Ga. Ct. App. 1973)
(rejecting invasion-of-privacy claim when employer had investigator drive past
employee's residence several times, park his car on a public road near employee's
home, and follow employee as he drove); York v. Gen. Elec. Co., 759 N.E.2d 865,
866 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (finding no invasion of privacy when defendant viewed
plaintiff, who had filed a workers' compensation claim, "arriving at work, going
into the chiropractor's office.... visiting a lawnmower repair shop .... working in
his yard, riding a motorcycle, mowing the grass, and performing other activities
in his yard" when the defendant never trespassed on the employee's property to
conduct the surveillance); see also Kowalski v. Scott, 126 F. App'x 558, 559-60 (3d
Cir. 2005) (holding that plaintiff failed to state a claim under the Fourth Amend-
ment when his employer hired a private investigator to conduct surveillance of
him in public areas at or near a beach while he was on vacation).
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[or] outside their homes ... have no claim for invasion of privacy."2 32
This even applies, for example, to surreptitiously videotaping an em-
ployee in his or her church, as long as the church service is open to the
public.2 33
The lawful-vantage-point concept also applies to surveillance from
a public location when the employee is in his or her home. For exam-
ple, in Digirolamo v. D.P. Anderson & Associates, Inc. ,234 a case in-
volving surveillance of an employee receiving workers' compensation
benefits, the court granted the defendant summary judgment when
the defendant watched the plaintiff in her condominium, because the
surveillance was conducted from a public street. 23 5
When, however, the surveillance is conducted from a location
where the defendant did not have a right to be, courts have found an
invasion of privacy. For example, in Love v. Southern Bell Telephone
& Telegraph Co.,236 the plaintiff sued for invasion of privacy when his
supervisors, after he failed to report to work, entered his home with-
out his permission and viewed him passed out with empty beer cans
strewn about.23 7 The court affirmed the jury's conclusion that the
plaintiff proved an invasion of privacy, stating that the proper stan-
dard was whether the supervisors' acts were "reasonable under the
circumstances." 238 The court added: "Stated another way, were their
reasons for entering plaintiffs trailer motivated by a desire to help...
or were they in the furtherance of their employer's interest and de-
signed to prove plaintiffs unworthiness as a supervisory em-
ployee."2 3 9 Although the court did not characterize the test as one
232. Wilborn, supra note 28, at 846 n.80.
233. See Creel v. I.C.E. & Assocs., 771 N.E.2d 1276, 1283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (re-
jecting claim when employer's investigator videotaped employee playing piano at
church service).
234. No. Civ. A. 97-3623, 1999 WL 345592 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 26, 1999).
235. Id. at *5. I believe the holding in Digirolamo was correct. As Professor Gross has
noted, "a great many practices in our society are designed to create or preserve"
privacy, including window blinds. Gross, supra note 170, at 36. An employee
should be expected to take advantage of such practices to the extent reasonably
possible. Thus, if a person has window blinds and chooses not to close them,
cannot one presume he or she has assumed the risk of being viewed? As Profes-
sor Gross notes, "[I]n some instances the law itself is the social practice used to
create privacy-for example, restrictions upon further disclosure of personal in-
formation obtained by the Government. More often, the law is only a back-up
protection for privacy, resorted to when other means to insure privacy have been
frustrated." Id. If a person does not close his or her blinds, he or she has not used
the means available to ensure his or her privacy. Thus, the individual should not
be entitled to such back-up protection. The law should only intervene when the
employee has taken advantage of such measures. The law should generally not
protect the careless; it should be designed to encourage careful conduct.
236. 263 So. 2d 460 (La. Ct. App. 1972).
237. Id. at 461-63.
238. Id. at 466.
239. Id.
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based on whether the employer had a lawful right to enter the trailer,
that was in fact the test described by the court. If the supervisors had
a legitimate concern for the employee's safety, they had a legal right to
enter the trailer,2 40 and there would have been no invasion of privacy.
If, however, they did not have a legal right to enter the trailer, there
would have been an invasion of privacy.
The lawful-vantage-point concept also explains Souder v. Pendle-
ton Detectives Inc.,241 a case that was correctly decided, but for the
wrong reason. In Souder, the plaintiffs, a husband and his wife, sued
a detective company that was hired by the insurance company of the
husband's employer to conduct surveillance on him after he filed a
workers' compensation claim. 24 2 The plaintiffs asserted that two
detectives eavesdropped on them, viewed them with binoculars, took
pictures of them, and watched them in their home by looking through
their windows. 2 43 The court held that the plaintiffs had sufficiently
alleged a claim for invasion of privacy because if the detectives tres-
passed on the plaintiffs' property and peered through their windows,
they would have been guilty of a crime under Louisiana's Peeping Tom
statute. 24 4 The court held that "if a possible crime was committed, a
suit in civil damages would be present."245 Although it was erroneous
for the court to rely simply on whether a criminal law was violated,
the court reached the correct result, and a result consistent with the
lawful-vantage-point concept, because the defendant conducted the
surveillance from a location where it did not have the legal right to be
(and presumably it could not have conducted the same surveillance
from a lawful vantage point).
A review of the invasion of privacy cases involving the surveillance
of employees in the workplace demonstrates that, consistent with the
lawful-vantage-point concept, employees generally have no right to be
free from surreptitious surveillance by their employer in the work-
place.2 46 Because the employer has a lawful right to be at its own
240. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 197 (1965) ("One is privileged to enter or
remain on land in the possession of another if it is or reasonably appears to be
necessary to prevent serious harm to ... the other or a third person, or the land
or chattels of either, unless the actor knows or has reason to know that the one
for whose benefit he enters is unwilling that he shall take such action."). The
Restatement provides the following example: "A, passing B's dwelling, hears issu-
ing from it screams indicating that some person inside is in distress. A is privi-
leged to enter the dwelling for the purpose of rendering assistance." Id. illus. 8.
241. 88 So. 2d 716 (La. Ct. App. 1956).
242. Id. at 717.
243. Id. at 717-18.
244. Id. at 718.
245. Id.
246. See, e.g., Gruber, supra note 80, at 363 ("[T]here is generally no expectation of
privacy.., in the workplace."); Wilborn, supra note 28, at 846 n.80 ("The law of
privacy does not conceive of an employee's physical workspace as a place of per-
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workplace, the employer has the right to view anything that is in plain
view from such a vantage point. "Plain view," in the context of em-
ployer surveillance of employees, would include anything that is in
plain view of an area of the workplace that the employee understands
is subject to the employer's right to enter without the employee's per-
mission. For example, it is not an invasion of privacy to conduct sur-
veillance of an employee break room if it is understood that the
employer has the right to enter unannounced.247
Consistent with the lawful-vantage-point concept, employees do
not have a right of privacy in offices that can be accessed by supervi-
sors. For example, in Sacramento County Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n v.
County of Sacramento,248 county jail employees filed a civil action
against their employer because of video surveillance of a county jail
sonal seclusion," and "employees observed or photographed while ... in public
areas of their workplaces generally have no claim for invasion of privacy.");
Finkin, Employee Privacy, supra note 61, at 264 ("The law of privacy does not
conceive of the physical workspace one enters as a place of personal 'seclusion.'").
The case law is not only consistent with the lawful-vantage-point concept, but
with an empirical approach to privacy as well. There is a decreased expectation
of privacy in the workplace that arises from the notion that an employer has pur-
chased, to a certain extent, control over an employee through the payment of
wages, and that as part of this bargain the employee has waived or consented to
surveillance in the workplace. "Privacy is territorial and is seen as a possessive
right that may be alienated preemptively and wholesale.... When a worker sells
her capacity to labor, she alienates certain aspects of the person and puts them
under the control of the employer." Rothstein, supra note 226, at 382 (footnote
omitted). Interestingly, "[tihe general sense of both employees and the public is
that employees who enter an employer's premises to do paid work have left 'pri-
vate' space and entered a 'public' arena." Alan F. Westin, Privacy in the Work-
place: How Well Does American Law Reflect American Values, 72 CHi-KENr L.
REV. 271, 276 (1996). As stated by several commentators:
The demands of employment and the traditional notions of work negate
most expectations of being in control of personal space. And while em-
ployment may be instrumental in the general pursuit to control the
spheres of one's choices in life, an employee's freedom of choice is circum-
scribed by the employer's control over the details of job performance.
Blackburn, Klayman & Nathan, supra note 180, at 48.
247. See, e.g., Branham v. Celadon Trucking Servs., 744 N.E.2d 514, 524 (Ind. Ct. App.
2001) (rejecting invasion-of-privacy claim when supervisor and coworker took
plaintiffs picture in break room because other employees used the area to eat
lunch); Brannen v. Kings Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 761 N.E.2d 84, 91-92
(Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (holding employees did not have reasonable expectation of
privacy under Fourth Amendment in break room because other school employees
"had unfettered access to the break room, including the principal and most of the
teachers," and that even if plaintiffs had reasonable expectation of privacy, sur-
veillance was reasonable, limited in scope, and justified). But see State v. Bon-
nell, 856 P.2d 1265, 1273-77 (Haw. 1993) (holding that employees had reasonable
expectation of privacy in break room under Fourth Amendment based in part on
fact that employees "could see anyone approaching and could avoid being sur-
prised by an untrusted intruder").
248. 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 834 (Ct. App. 1996).
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office.249 After eleven incidents of inmates' money going missing, the
employer installed a concealed video surveillance camera (without au-
dio capabilities) in the jail ceiling overlooking the booking area. 250
The court, however, rejected the plaintiffs' invasion-of-privacy
claim, 251 holding that, among other things, "the 'intrusion' took place
in a nonprivate office in the booking area of a county jail, wherein
plaintiffs had a diminished expectation of privacy."25 2
A similar case is Marrs v. Marriott Corp.25 3 In Marrs, a security
investigator who discovered that someone had accessed the locked file
drawer of his desk requested and received permission from his em-
ployer to monitor the desk with a hidden video camera.2 54 The video-
tape disclosed the plaintiff employee picking the lock on the desk
drawer with a paper clip and looking through files.255 In response,
the plaintiff told the employer he was "practicing his lock picking
skills," and the employer, not entirely convinced, fired him. 256 The
plaintiff then brought a civil action alleging, among other things, inva-
sion of privacy.2 5 7 The court rejected the claim, holding that the
plaintiff did not have "a reasonable expectation of privacy in an open
office." 258 The court noted that the plaintiff conceded that the area
"was a common area that all of [the security guards] had access to."259
Consistent with the lawful-vantage-point concept, there is no right
of privacy in dressing and changing rooms if any employee can walk
into the room. This is demonstrated by Thompson v. Johnson County
Community College.2 60 In Thompson, the plaintiffs were security of-
ficers employed by the defendant college. 2 6 1 The college provided its
security officers with a locker area in which to secure their gear and
other personal items, and security personnel would occasionally use
this area as a dressing and changing room.2 62 Other personnel also
used the area and did not need permission from the security personnel
before entering. 26 3 The college installed a video surveillance camera
in the area to investigate allegations of theft from security personnel
249. Id. at 836.
250. Id. at 837.
251. Id. at 846-47.
252. Id. at 847.
253. 830 F. Supp. 274 (D. Md. 1992).




258. Id. at 283.
259. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
260. 930 F. Supp. 501 (D. Kan. 1996), affd, No. 96-3223, 1997 WL 139760 (10th Cir.
Mar. 25, 1997) (unpublished table decision).
261. Id. at 503.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 503-04.
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lockers and allegations that security personnel were bringing weapons
to work. 26 4 When the security officers filed suit for invasion of pri-
vacy, the court rejected the claim, noting that the "area was not en-
closed" and the "[p]laintiffs' activities could be viewed by anyone
walking into or through the.., area."2 65 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit
affirmed. 26 6
The limitation, however, on the lawful-vantage-point concept when
the defendant engages in conduct to obtain a view of the plaintiff that
could not ordinarily be had from a lawful vantage point, applies to
surveillance in the workplace. This is demonstrated by Speer v. Ohio
Department of Rehabilitation & Correction.2 67 In Speer, a prison's ad-
ministrative captain, whose duties involved conducting investigations
for the prison's chief of security, received information that an em-
ployee was becoming too friendly with some of the inmates. 268 The
captain began an investigation and as part of the investigation, he
"positioned himself in the ceiling of a staff restroom for over seven
hours" to spy on the employee. 26 9 The court stated that while the
"proper and efficient operation of the institution was of top priority
and, unquestionably, reasonable surveillance of employees in an insti-
tutional setting is an acceptable investigative tool, . . .we have been
unable to find any evidence that the [administrative captain's] admit-
ted conduct in the bathroom was defensible as a policy matter."27 0
This holding is consistent with the exception to the lawful-vantage-
point concept because the captain engaged in conduct to obtain a view
of the plaintiff he could not have otherwise had.
Employees might also have a claim for employer surveillance of a
dressing area. For example, in Doe v. B.P.S Guard Services, Inc.,2 7 1 a
case previously discussed with respect to determining which activities
are private, the court affirmed a jury verdict for the plaintiffs (who
were female fashion models) when security guards surreptitiously
videotaped them in their dressing area. 27 2 This holding is not only
consistent with the limitation on the lawful-vantage-point concept re-
garding situations in which the defendant engages in conduct to ob-
264. Id. at 504.
265. Id. at 507.
266. Thompson v. Johnson County Cmty. Coll., No. 96-3223, 1997 WL 139760 (10th
Cir. Mar. 25, 1997) (unpublished table decision).
267. 624 N.E.2d 251 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
268. Id. at 252.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 254. See also Harkey v. Abate, 346 N.W.2d 74 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (hold-
ing that installation of hidden viewing device in public restroom for patrons at
skating rink constituted invasion of privacy).
271. 945 F.2d 1422 (8th Cir. 1991).
272. Id. at 1427; see also Liberti v. Walt Disney World Co., 912 F. Supp. 1494, 1506
(M.D. Fla. 1995) (denying summary judgment for employer on invasion-of-pri-
vacy claim when coworker made holes in wall of dressing area to view plaintiffs).
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tain a view of the plaintiff that could not ordinarily be had from a
lawful vantage point, it is consistent with the group privacy or selec-
tive-disclosure concept discussed by Professor Lidsky. That plaintiffs
were willing to undress in front of other fashion models did not defeat
their invasion-of-privacy claims against other persons.
Also, an office in which employees receive medical treatment is an
area that it would be understood an employer does not have the right
to enter during the examination, thus precluding surveillance. In
Acuff v. IBP, Inc.,2 73 discussed previously in the section involving "in-
tent," the employer conducted surveillance of the nurse manager's of-
fice, where employee medical examinations occurred. Employees who
had received medical treatment in the office then filed suit against the
company for invasion of privacy, and the court held for the employ-
ees.2 7 4 The holding in Acuff, like the holding in B.P.S. Guard Ser-
vices, is consistent with the exception to the lawful-vantage-point
concept when the defendant engages in conduct to obtain a view of the
plaintiff that could not ordinarily be had, as well as the group privacy
or selective-disclosure concept (because the examiner's presence did
not defeat the claim).
What about an office with a closed door? As Professor Hyman
Gross has recognized, permissible conduct would vary depending on
which sign (literally or figuratively) is on the door. A sign that states
"Do Not Enter" has a different effect from a sign that says "Authorized
Personnel Only."2 75 In the employment setting, if it is understood
that management can enter an office without knocking, then the law-
ful-vantage-point concept will entitle management to conduct surrep-
titious surveillance of the office. But if there is a lock on the door, and
management does not have a key, the lawful-vantage-point concept
would not permit surveillance. The employee, however, would need to
be seen engaging in some sort of private activity in the office for there
to be liability, unless merely being alone is considered a private
activity.
D. Highly Offensive to a Reasonable Person
Even if an employer intentionally intrudes upon an employee's se-
clusion or solitude, or into his or her private affairs, "[t]here is ... no
liability unless the interference ... is a substantial one, of a kind that
would be highly offensive to the ordinary reasonable [person], as the
result of conduct to which the reasonable [person] would strongly ob-
ject."27 6 Thus, a person does not have the right to be free from any
273. 77 F. Supp. 2d 914 (C.D. Ill. 1999).
274. Id. at 926-35.
275. Gross, supra note 170, at 39.
276. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. d (1977).
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intrusion, only a highly offensive intrusion,27 7 and whether an intru-
sion is highly offensive is an objective test.2 78 Whether the intrusion
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person is a jury question, but
the court must first make a threshold determination of offensive-
ness.2 79 In deciding whether an intrusion is highly offensive, each
case is decided on its facts. 28 0
The key factor in deciding whether an employer's surveillance is
highly offensive is the employer's motive.2 81 Thus, "the penetration of
private space is often not 'highly offensive' unless perpetrated with
improper intent."28 2
A legitimate motive defeating an otherwise valid claim is best
demonstrated by a non-employment case, Plaxico v. Michael.283 In
Plaxico, the Mississippi Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a
plaintiffs invasion-of-privacy claim even though the defendant peered
through a window and took photographs of the plaintiff while she was
in bed nude. The defendant was seeking to obtain custody of his child,
and suspected that his ex-wife was having a homosexual relationship
with the plaintiff, who was living with his ex-wife. 28 4 With respect to
the taking of the photographs, the court held that "this conduct is not
highly offensive to the ordinary person which would cause the reason-
able person to object," and "[iun fact, most reasonable people would feel
[the defendant's] actions were justified in order to protect the welfare
of his minor child."285 Two justices dissented, one stating that "peep-
ing into the bedroom window of another is a gross violation of privacy
which may subject one to liability for intentional intrusion upon the
solitude or seclusion of that other,"28 6 the other justice believing that
only pictures of the defendant's ex-wife could "possibly be character-
ized as helpful to [the defendant's custody] case."28 7
In employment cases, most courts determine whether the intrusion
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person by balancing "the em-
ployer's interest in intruding and the employee's privacy interest."28 8
277. Finkin, Employee Privacy, supra note 61, at 227.
278. Black v. City & County of Honolulu, 112 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1053 (D. Haw. 2000).
279. Stein v. Marriot Ownership Resorts, Inc., 944 P.2d 374, 379 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
280. Black, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 1053.
281. Friedman, supra note 31, at 25-26 (footnote omitted); see also Cavico, supra note
33, at 1285 (noting that courts must consider "the employer's interest in ob-
taining the information" to determine whether employer's surveillance violates
employee's right of privacy).
282. Post, supra note 57, at 971.
283. 735 So. 2d 1036 (Miss. 1999).
284. Id. at 1038.
285. Id. at 1040.
286. Id. (Banks, J., dissenting).
287. Id. at 1041 (McRae, J., dissenting).
288. Gruber, supra note 80, at 367. See also Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d
611, 625 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating that balancing test is to be applied under Penn-
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Thus, "courts will measure expectations of privacy against employers'
business-related needs to intrude."28 9 It has therefore been noted
that
[t]he employee's right to privacy ... is a relative right. It requires a balance
between the contending interests of the employee's personal privacy expecta-
tions and the employer's traditional interests in quality, performance, and
productivity. Courts customarily balance the conflicting interests of employ-
ers and employees through the common law of torts.2 9 0
As stated by two commentators:
[Tihe courts specifically have recognized that an employee's common law right
of privacy is limited by an employer's countervailing rights arising out of the
employment relationship. Included among these is the right to engage in in-
vestigation of employees suspected of illegality, fraud, or other misconduct
committed in the course of employment. In exercising this right, employers
even have been allowed to conduct reasonable surveillance of employees
outside the workplace. 2 9 1
In fact, "[clases involving the surveillance type of invasion of pri-
vacy tort give primacy to an employer's [sic] protecting its business
interests."2 9 2 As stated by Professor S. Elizabeth Wilborn:
Because routine monitoring can appear harmless from some perspective (es-
pecially that of a third party), and because the negative effects of such moni-
toring are often gradual and incremental, this standard frequently forecloses
an employee claim based on typical workplace monitoring and surveillance.
In particular, to the extent that the monitoring complained of can be arguably
linked to work-related activities, those challenges have been unsuccessful. 2 9 3
Accordingly, a legitimate purpose can be "dispositive in eliminating
liability."294 In fact, "a strong, countervailing employer business need
sylvania law); Decker, supra note 27, at 561 ("While employers may have legiti-
mate business interests that sometimes require infringing on employee privacy,
there are compelling reasons to limit this intrusion where no legitimate interest
exists."); Baxi & Nickel, supra note 36, at 143 ("Courts must balance the private
employer's interests against the employees' reasonable expectation of privacy.");
Conlon, supra note 30, at 290 ("In practice, courts will [therefore] first define the
scope of an employee's reasonable expectation of privacy and then balance the
employer's business interest against the employee's individual rights."); Kray &
Robertson, supra note 32, at 144 ("In determining whether enhanced monitoring
violates an employee's right to privacy, three factors are considered: the means
used in obtaining the information, the employer's purpose in obtaining the infor-
mation, and the nature of the information sought."). One commentator argues
that the concept of"reasonable expectation of privacy" has merged, in the employ-
ment law context, with the analysis of the employer's motive for conducting the
surveillance. King, supra note 29, at 461.
289. King, supra note 29, at 464.
290. Cavico, supra note 33, at 1345.
291. Jenero & Mapes-Riordan, supra note 65, at 83 (footnote omitted).
292. Cavico, supra note 33, at 1286.
293. Wilborn, supra note 28, at 845.
294. Friedman, supra note 31, at 26. See also Finkin, Employee Privacy, supra note
61, at 239-40 ("[Tlhe presence of a business purpose is often dispositive of the
legitimacy (technically the 'inoffensiveness') of the intrusion as a matter of
law. . . ."); Baxi & Nickel, supra note 36, at 143 ("An employer who monitors
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may legitimize even an intrusion into an employee's home."295 There-
fore, "[i]ntrusion by surveillance is nontortious if the employer can
point to a pertinent, legitimate, and significant business reason for the
surveillance. Although, if the means of intrusion are extremely offen-
sive courts may still impose liability."296
This factor helps insulate most employers from liability for surrep-
titious physical surveillance of employees because it is unusual for an
employer to conduct such surveillance for an illegitimate reason, and
the motive will usually be considered legitimate as long as it is work
related. For example, in Salazar v. Golden State Warriors,297 the
court stated that a "pertinent factor for a court to consider is whether
the intrusion is justified by a legitimate motive,"298 and then held that
the employer had a legitimate motive because it was "work-
related."2 99
There are numerous legitimate reasons why an employer would
conduct surveillance. Monitoring employees' work performance is le-
gitimate, and it has been recognized that "[m]ost workplace surveil-
lance techniques are permissible if the information sought pertains to
employee job functions."300 As two commentators have noted, "An em-
ployee would be hard-pressed to assert... that the employer's conduct
in monitoring the performance of [work] tasks, for legitimate business
purposes, through relatively unintrusive forms of electronic surveil-
lance, is 'highly offensive.'"301 "Supervisors have monitored workers
ever since the industrial revolution .... "302
employees in an effort to maintain a business interest would probably prevail
over such a claim [to privacy]."); Conlon, supra note 30, at 286 ("[Tlhe common
law legitimizes otherwise intrusive behavior if an employer can demonstrate a
business purpose.").
295. Cavico, supra note 33, at 1308-09.
296. Id. at 1286 (footnote omitted). Professor Wilborn's proposed federal legislation
would require an employer 'to have a legitimate business reason for any surveil-
lance it chose to conduct." Wilborn, supra note 28, at 880. Professor Cavico has
argued that
artificially enhanced electronic surveillance techniques targeting an in-
dividual employee or small group of employees are warranted only when
the employer has a serious problem, such as a crime, that cannot be
solved by traditional surveillance, or disclosed electronic surveillance,
and the employer has well-established, specific reasons for believing that
secret artificial surveillance means will detect the malefactor(s).
Cavico, supra note 33, at 1292.
297. No. C-99-4825 CRB, 2000 WL 246586 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2000).
298. Id. at *3.
299. Id.
300. Cavico, supra note 33, at 1286.
301. Jenero & Mapes-Riordan, supra note 65, at 82.
302. Note, Addressing the New Hazards of the High Technology Workplace, 104 HARv.
L. REV. 1898, 1903 (1991) [hereinafter Hazards].
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It is legitimate for an employer to conduct surveillance of employ-
ees to help increase efficiency. In Thomas v. General Electric Co.,303
the plaintiff sued his employer after his employer took his picture
without his permission. 3 04 The employer "engaged in the practice of
taking and using motion pictures for the purpose of documenting the
layout of equipment and machinery, and the movements of employees
while engaged in the performance of their respective jobs."3 05 The
court found that "[s]uch pictures are efficient, effective, and economi-
cal means of studying methods of production and the individual opera-
tions involved therein. They are used as aids in studying and
establishing time standards and safe, efficient manufacturing meth-
ods and procedures."3 06
The plaintiff had requested that his employer not take pictures of
him because he felt it invaded his privacy, but the employer took his
picture anyway.30 7 The motion pictures of the plaintiff were to be
used by the employer only in the study of its operations. 308 The court
held that the employer had not violated the plaintiffs right to pri-
vacy. 30 9 The court relied on the lack of any evidence that the photo-
graphs were taken for "any purpose other than to be studies in order
to increase the efficiency of defendant's operations and to promote the
safety of its employees in the discharge of the duties they were em-
ployed to perform."3 10 The court stated that "[n]o case has been re-
ferred to the Court and the Court has found none forbidding an
employer to use such means to improve the efficiency of its workers
and promote their safety."311
It is also legitimate for an employer to conduct surveillance as part
of a workplace investigation. For example, in DeLury v. Kretchmer,3 12
the court noted that the employer had shown ample reason for taking
pictures of employees when the pictures were being taken as part of
an investigation into employee wrongdoing and were going to be
shown to the complainants. 3 13
Although physical surveillance away from the workplace is per-
haps less common than surveillance at the workplace, 3 1 4 employers
sometimes have a legitimate interest in employees' off-duty con-
303. 207 F. Supp. 792 (W.D. Ky. 1962).
304. Id. at 792.




309. Id. at 799.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. 322 N.Y.S.2d 517 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
313. Id. at 518-19.
314. Boehmer, supra note 27, at 757 n.84.
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duct,3 15 and "[n]o bright lines can be drawn between personal and
business activities."316 An employer might have a legitimate interest
in knowing whether an employee is engaged in off-duty illegal acts, or
whether the employee is engaged in off-duty violations of the em-
ployee's duty of loyalty.3 1 7 As one commentator has noted, "Employ-
ers possess permissible concerns regarding their employee's off-the-job
behavior, actions, or personality characteristics that adversely affect
work performance, productivity, the employer's standing, or other em-
ployees. Certain off-the-job conduct can be treated as work related
and, therefore, properly subject to scrutiny and restraint."318
It is a legitimate motive for an employer to conduct surveillance of
an off-duty employee to defend a legal claim asserted by the employee.
The court in Ellenberg v. Pinkerton's, Inc.,3 19 stated that
[r]easonable surveillance is recognized as a common method to obtain evi-
dence to defend a lawsuit. It is only when such is conducted in a vicious or
malicious manner not reasonably limited and designated to obtain informa-
tion needed for the defense of a lawsuit or deliberately calculated to frighten
or torment the plaintiff, that the courts will not countenance it.3
2 0
For example, in Johnson v. Corporate Special Services, Inc.,3 2 1 the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant invaded his privacy by conducting
surveillance on him while investigating his workers' compensation
claim, 3 22 but the court found that the purpose of the investigation was
legitimate because "the predominant issue in the workman's compen-
sation case was the extent of [the plaintiffs] injury."323
One court has even upheld viewing an off-duty employee through a
window in his house with the use of a high-powered camera lens when
the motive was legitimate. In Saldana v. Kelsey-Hayes Co.,324 the
court held that although "the use of a powerful lens to observe the
interior of a home . . .could be found objectionable to a reasonable
315. Some states, however, have statutes restricting an employer's ability to discipline
employees for engaging in certain off-duty activities. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 24-34-402.5(1) (2005) ("any lawful activity"); N.Y. LAB. LAw § 201-d(2)(c) (Mc-
Kinney 2000) ("legal recreational activities").
316. Kray & Robertson, supra note 32, at 144.
317. Richard M. Howe, Minding Your Business: Employer Liability for Invasion of Pri-
vacy, 7 LAB. L.J. 315, 345, 382-83 (1991).
318. Cavico, supra note 33, at 1309 (footnote omitted). It has been suggested, how-
ever, that some employers "assert that everything about an employee is relevant
and necessary in determining suitability for employment. Thus, the employer
feels it is important to know if the employee smokes marijuana at home, is a
homosexual, or socializes with the 'wrong' kind of people." Decker, supra note 27,
at 561.
319. 202 S.E.2d 701 (Ga. Ct. App. 1973).
320. Id. at 704.
321. 602 So. 2d 385 (Ala. 1992).
322. Id. at 386.
323. Id. at 388.
324. 443 N.W.2d 382 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
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person,"3 2 5 the intrusion at issue was into matters that the plaintiff
had no right to keep private. 32 6 In Saldana, the plaintiff had suffered
a work-related injury, and the defendant suspected the plaintiff was
malingering.3 27 The court stated that "[t]he defendants' duty to re-
frain from intrusion into another's private affairs is not absolute in
nature, but rather is limited by those rights which arise from social
conditions, including the business relationship of the parties."328 The
court noted that the "[d] efendants' surveillance of plaintiff at his home
involved matters which defendants had a legitimate right to investi-
gate .... Plaintiffs privacy was subject to the legitimate interest of
his employer in investigating suspicions that plaintiffs work-related
disability was a pretext."3 29 One judge dissented, believing that "an
allegation of pervasive surveillance of the investigatory target
through the windows of his own home, particularly when accom-
plished by means of a camera lens, at a minimum creates a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether the intrusion was
unwarranted."330
Of course, there are also illegitimate motives for surveillance,
"such as frustration of union organizing efforts, circumvention of em-
ployment discrimination laws via intensified scrutiny of protected em-
ployees, and identification of whistleblowers."3 3 1  Sometimes,
therefore, the employer's motive will be at issue. For example, recall
that in Love v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.332 whether
an invasion of privacy was committed by supervisors entering an em-
ployee's home hinged on whether the supervisors' "reasons for enter-
ing plaintiffs trailer [were] motivated by a desire to help, . . . or
[whether they were] in the furtherance of their employer's interest
and designed to prove plaintiffs unworthiness as a supervisory em-
ployee"33 3 (which apparently was not a sufficient business reason to
overcome the severity of the intrusion).
325. Id. at 384.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 383.
328. Id. at 384.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 385 (Holbrook, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
331. Wilborn, supra note 28, at 827 n.8 (citing OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, THE
ELECTRONIC SUPERVISOR: NEW TECHNOLOGY, NEW TENSIONS 102-04 (1987)). See
also Westin, supra note 246, at 276-77 ("[11f employees can show that the real
purpose of employer surveillance is not to assure proper work performance or
prevent crime at work sites, but to identify whistle blowers, or find out what
employees think of management policies, or spy on union organizing campaigns,
or satisfy voyeuristic impulses, then American law provides employees with rem-
edies against such improperly-motivated employer behavior.").
332. 263 So. 2d 460 (La. Ct. App. 1972).
333. Id. at 466.
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Also, if the employer intentionally seeks and obtains information
that is not relevant to the employer's interest that initially motivated
the surveillance, an employer will likely not be able to rely on the le-
gitimate motive to defeat an otherwise valid claim. For example, in
I.C.U. Investigations, Inc. v. Jones,3 34 the justices disagreed as to
whether the video of the plaintiff urinating was in furtherance of the
employer's investigation of the plaintiffs alleged injury.33 5
An illegitimate purpose, however, will not render unlawful the sur-
veillance of an employee from a lawful vantage point. For example, in
Pemberton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.336 there was evidence that the de-
fendants conducted surveillance of a (married) union business agent
to determine "whether [he] had girlfriends and where he got his
money."33 7 The court noted that such a purpose could "have only the
most tangential relevance to any legitimate concern of [the defend-
ants]."338 Notwithstanding, the court stated that the defendants
would have been entitled to summary judgment if the surveillance
had been limited to observing him outside his residence, outside what
appeared to be his girlfriend's home, outside a shopping center and
convenience store, and along public roads.3 39 What kept the defend-
ants from obtaining summary judgment was evidence that they had
used a listening device as part of the surveillance.340
The conclusion that an improper motive by itself is not sufficient to
establish a claim is consistent with the requirement that the plaintiff
show an intrusion into his or her seclusion or solitude, or private af-
fairs or concerns, in addition to showing that the intrusion was offen-
sive. Motive is thus used to make non-tortious a surveillance that
would otherwise be actionable. For example, as previously discussed,
an employer's motive in determining whether an allegedly injured em-
ployee is malingering justifies viewing the plaintiff in his home
334. 780 So. 2d 685 (Ala. 2000).
335. See id. at 690 (Cook, J., dissenting) ("Clearly, a videotape of Jones urinating in
his yard served no legitimate purpose in Jones's workers' compensation case.").
Jones demonstrates the difficult position employers and their investigators would
be put in if liability could attach for surveillance that furthers a legitimate inter-
est but that happens to capture an employee unexpectedly engaging in a private
act (such as urinating in the front yard). If Justice Cook's dissent were the law, it
would put the employer or its investigator in the position of deciding, at the time
the footage is being taken, whether any activities are not relevant to the investi-
gation. If the investigator made a mistake in Jones, I do not believe it was taking
the footage of the plaintiff urinating, but was perhaps disclosing the tape to the
employer's attorney without inquiring as to whether such footage would be rele-
vant to the workers' compensation case (presuming such an inquiry was not
made).
336. 502 A.2d 1101 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986).
337. Id. at 1116.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 1117.
340. Id.
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through a window with open curtains, even when image-enhancing
equipment is used. 341
Because, however, it is a balancing test, courts are empowered to
assess the strength of an employer's motive (as in Love) and balance it
against an employee's privacy interest. Thus, if an employer tres-
passes onto an employee's land, peers through a window of the em-
ployee's house, and views the employee engaged in an intimate
activity, a weak employer motive (such as a concern that an em-
ployee's homosexual relationship will impact its business) would most
likely be insufficient to defeat the privacy claim. But consistent with
employment law generally, courts will most likely not second-guess
whether an employer's asserted business motive is legitimate.3 42
E. The Rule Governing Employers' Surreptitious Physical
Surveillance of Employees
Based on the foregoing, the rule regarding when an employer's sur-
reptitious physical surveillance violates an employee's common law
right to privacy can be stated as follows: An employee has a claim if(1)
the employer actually conducts surveillance of the employee; (2) the
employer intends to conduct surveillance of the employee engaged in
private activities or should know the surveillance will capture the em-
ployee engaged in private activities; (3) the surveillance is of the em-
ployee engaged in private activities; (4) the employer, when
conducting the surveillance, could not have had that view from a law-
ful vantage point, or is engaged in conduct to obtain a view of the em-
ployee that could not ordinarily be had from a lawful vantage point;
and (5) the employer's motive in conducting the surveillance does not
outweigh the employee's privacy interest.
V. SHOULD COURTS EXPAND AN EMPLOYEE'S RIGHT
TO BE FREE FROM SURREPTITIOUS PHYSICAL
SURVEILLANCE BY HIS OR HER EMPLOYER?
The above analysis of the case law demonstrates that an invasion-
of-privacy claim will only be stated with respect to an employer's sur-
reptitious physical surveillance of employees in limited circumstances.
This state of the law, and the state of privacy law generally, has led
some commentators to argue for an expansion of employee privacy
rights. Proponents of an expanded right of employee privacy argue
that a lawsuit under the current state of the law is usually futile3 43
341. Saldana v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 443 N.W.2d 382, 384 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
342. See, e.g., Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 825 (1st Cir. 1991) ("Courts
may not sit as super personnel departments, assessing the merits-or even the
rationality-of employers' nondiscriminatory business decisions.").
343. See King, supra note 29, at 449.
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and that the "[tihe tort of intrusion has never lived up to its poten-
tial."34 4 The failure to succeed in obtaining legislation expanding em-
ployee privacy rights345 presents the question of whether state courts
should step in and expand such rights under the common law, and in
particular, under the tort of intrusion.
As discussed below, there are insufficient reasons for courts to
modify the existing law regarding employers' surreptitious physical
surveillance of employees. In analyzing whether a change in the law
via the court's common law powers is warranted, I rely on Professor
Melvin Eisenberg's descriptive account in The Nature of the Common
Law of how courts decide common law cases,34 6 including when courts
generally overturn precedent.3 4 7
Professor Eisenberg asserts that the real-world model of the com-
mon law incorporates three standards: (1) social congruence; (2) sys-
temic consistency; and (3) doctrinal stability.3 48  By "social
congruence" Eisenberg is referring to the common law ideal that "the
body of rules that make up the law should correspond to the body of
legal rules that one would arrive at by giving appropriate weight to all
applicable social propositions and making the best choices where such
propositions collide."3 49 By "systemic consistency" Eisenberg is refer-
ring to the common law ideal that "all the rules that make up the body
of the law should be consistent with one another."3 50 By "doctrinal
stability" Eisenberg is principally referring to stare decisis.351
Because the real-world model of the common law incorporates the
standard of doctrinal stability in addition to the standards of social
congruence and systemic consistency, criticism of a legal rule based on
the rule's failure to satisfy the latter standards still might not warrant
a change. According to Eisenberg, a legal rule should only be over-
344. Lidsky, supra note 179, at 203.
345. Such efforts have even included proposed federal legislation. See supra note 29.
It has also been noted that "[alttempted legislative action on the state level [with
respect to employee privacy] has been repeatedly blocked by company threats to
move their business to a state without the proposed restrictions." Wilborn, supra
note 28, at 862. See also Finkin, Employee Privacy, supra note 61, at 224 ("In
terms of positive law, the legislative response has varied from the occasional and
piecemeal . . . to the non-existent. The latter may be explained for the most part
by the politics of privacy, which pits organized business interests against a
largely unorganized mass of individual workers.").
346. See Frederick Schauer, Is the Common Law Law?, 77 CAL. L. REV. 455, 456-57
(1989) (reviewing EISENBERG, supra note 109, and concluding that "Eisenberg's
objective is more to explain than to defend the method of the common law").
347. EISENBERG, supra note 109.
348. Id. at 49.
349. Id. at 44.
350. Id. Professor Eisenberg states that the "[a]ttainment of this ideal promotes pre-
dictability and evenhandedness and furthers the legitimacy of the law by demon-
strating its formal rationality." Id.
351. Id. at 47.
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ruled if "(i) it substantially fails to satisfy the standards of social con-
gruence and systematic consistency, and (ii) the values that underlie
the standard of doctrinal stability and the principle of stare decisis...
would be no better served by the preservation of a doctrine than by its
overruling."35 2 For reasons of stability, as long as an announced rule
is substantially congruent with applicable social propositions, the rule
should not be abandoned or altered simply because a competing rule is
marginally more congruent with such propositions. 35 3
Employing Eisenberg's real-world model of the common law to de-
termine whether the law regarding employers conducting surrepti-
tious surveillance of employees should be altered demonstrates that it
should not.
A. Social Congruence
There is little support for a conclusion that the current rules re-
garding employer surveillance are substantially incongruent with ap-
plicable social propositions. Of the three types of social propositions
identified by Eisenberg-(1) moral norms; (2) policies; and (3) experi-
ential propositions 354-the first two are relevant to whether the law
involving surreptitious surveillance is substantially incongruent with
applicable social propositions. 355
1. Moral Norms
Eisenberg describes moral norms as "moral standards that claim to
be rooted in aspirations for the community as a whole, and that, on
the basis of an appropriate methodology, can fairly be said to have
substantial support in the community, can be derived from norms that
have such support, or appear as if they would have such support."356
Many commentators argue that existing privacy law is in need of
change because it does not implement the correct definition of privacy,
thus suggesting the law does not correctly reflect a moral norm. Such
an argument, however, is unavailing, at least with respect to employer
physical surveillance, because there does not appear to be any empiri-
cal support for an assertion that the employer physical surveillance
considered non-tortious by the courts is viewed as morally wrong by a
substantial portion of the community.
Constructing a criticism of existing privacy law on the basis that
courts are employing an incorrect (and allegedly narrow) definition of
352. Id. at 104-05.
353. Id. at 3.
354. Id. at 14.
355. See id. at 37 ("Experiential propositions are propositions about the way the world
works.").
356. Id. at 15.
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privacy is easy, but not necessarily because courts are out of touch
with applicable moral norms. Rather, constructing such a criticism is
easy because the concept of privacy lends itself to so many different
definitions. 35 7 As one commentator has stated, "In a philosophical
sense, 'privacy' proves nearly impossible to define because of its inher-
ent subjectivity."3 58 While "the concept of privacy has become perva-
sive in modern legal thought[,] ... a clear definition of this right...
has eluded both courts and legal scholars. It is the fundamental na-
ture of the concept that leads to such great difficulty in applica-
tion."3 59 Some commentators, notably Hyman Gross, have argued for
a more narrow definition of privacy. 3 60  Other "[legal schol-
ars.., speak in broad terms when referring to privacy," and "[p]rivacy
[then] envelops a wide range of topics relating to integrity, personal
property, movement, sensibilities, and information."3 61
Some commentators who define privacy broadly, define it based on
the interest it is designed to protect. For example, Professor Edward
Bloustein argued that Prosser was wrong in asserting that the inter-
est to be protected is an emotional one, and that the right to privacy
protects the principle of "human personality," and that the "gist of the
wrong" is a "blow to human integrity."3 62 "To Bloustein, privacy is a
matter of respect for persons."3 63 Similarly, Professor Robert Post ar-
357. It is debatable whether privacy can even be defined as a single concept; some
commentators question whether there is a separate "right to privacy." See Ruth
Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 422 (1980) ("Commen-
tators have argued that privacy rhetoric is misleading: when we study the cases
in which the law (or our moral intuitions) suggest that a 'right to privacy' has
been violated, we always find that some other interest has been involved."). Pro-
fessor Gavison refers to such commentators as "reductionists" because "they are
united in denying the utility of thinking and talking about privacy as a legal
right, and suggest some form of reductionism." Id. Professor Solove notes that
"some theorists, referred to as 'reductionists,' claim that the impoverishment of
the discourse is symptomatic of the fact that privacy should not be understood as
a distinct conception. They argue that privacy is reducible to other conceptions
and rights." Solove, supra note 132, at 1124.
358. King, supra note 29, at 444.
359. Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123, 1128 (Alaska 1989). An
array of legal theorists have attempted to define "privacy" in either a descriptive
sense in order to explain the common theme in the case law protecting privacy, or
in a normative sense to show what the law should protect. In either event, these
theorists have sought to isolate privacy's core characteristics, referred to by one
scholar as "the quest for a common denominator or essence" of privacy. Solove,
supra note 132, at 1099.
360. Gross, supra note 170.
361. Shawn C. Helms, Translating Privacy Values with Technology, 7 B.U. J. Sci. &
TECH. L. 288, 300 (2001). Perhaps the most notable example of a court applying
an expansive definition of privacy with respect to the tort of intrusion is Harkey v.
Abate, 346 N.W.2d 74 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983), discussed previously.
362. Bloustein, supra note 73, at 974.
363. Blackburn, Klayman & Nathan, supra note 180, at 46 n.15.
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gues that one kind of interest involved in privacy cases is an interest
that "arises from the dignitary harm which plaintiffs suffer as a result
of having been treated disrespectfully."36 4 Post argues that the vic-
tim's "status as a person to whom respect is due has been called into
question" by the defendant.3 65 One commentator has argued that "[i]f
privacy actions were understood to encompass human dignity con-
cerns, as Bloustein persuasively advocates, privacy doctrine would
certainly provide modern workers with some protection from the cur-
rent abusive practices."36 6
Thus, by simply defining privacy broadly, commentators can easily
argue that the current state of the law does not fully protect employee
privacy. For example, if privacy rights extend to any employer con-
duct deemed disrespectful, an argument can be made that any surrep-
titious physical surveillance is an invasion of privacy.
Fortunately, I need not join the debate over the proper definition of
privacy.3 6 7 As previously discussed, to be overturned, a legal rule
must be substantially incongruent with applicable social propositions
(including moral norms). The above difference of opinion about the
definition of privacy demonstrates that advocates of an expansive
view of privacy cannot yet claim that the definition employed by the
courts is substantially incongruent with current moral norms. For ex-
ample, one commentator argued that a survey in the 1990s involving
monitoring business telephone calls showed that "majorities of the
public and of working people are unconvinced that employee privacy is
threatened by legitimate employer monitoring of work."3 68
Additionally, courts should be wary to conclude that a common law
rule is substantially incongruent with moral norms when efforts at
changing the rule (or similar rules) through legislative action have
364. Post, supra note 57, at 967.
365. Id. at 968.
366. Hazards, supra note 302, at 1914.
367. I will, however, state that I do not believe that the objections to physical surveil-
lance, at least as they relate to monitoring employees in the workplace for per-
formance issues, in fact relate to privacy. As Professor Boehmer has recognized,
"It may ... be argued that artificial monitoring and surveillance in the workplace
is not really an issue of privacy because employees expect to be observed as part
of the normal supervision process; employees do not have a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in the employment relationship." Boehmer, supra note 27, at 770.
As noted by Professor Westin, "[Wihen advocates claim that performance moni-
toring is a privacy issue... the concept of privacy is stretched beyond its rational
limits." Westin, supra note 246, at 282. Rather, if there is any legal concept
under which such surveillance should be analyzed, it is intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Courts, however, have correctly been hesitant to apply this
tort to the workplace. See Decker, supra note 27, at 572 ("Intentional infliction of
emotional distress may arise in the employment context if there is an intrusion
into an employee's privacy that is extremely outrageous. Hence, this tort is only
useful for redressing the most extreme employment privacy invasions.").
368. Westin, supra note 246, at 282.
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failed. Although some commentators argue that big business has
thwarted efforts to increase employee privacy rights, it is doubtful
that courts should increase privacy rights based on a perception that
the democratic system is not operating fairly. If that is the case, the
root of any such problem should be addressed, instead of courts adopt-
ing rules that they believe would be enacted if the legislative process
operated fairly.
Importantly, this is not a situation in which the persons adversely
affected are in a minority group and cannot adequately protect their
interests through the legislative process or through unionization.
Every person who is employed is subject to surreptitious employer
surveillance. 36 9 The issue of surreptitious surveillance is thus not
analogous to issues facing minority groups, such as employment
discrimination. 3 70
Also, the lawful-vantage-point concept in fact promotes a moral
norm, the moral norm that a person has the freedom to be present at
lawful vantage points, and the corresponding freedom to observe his
or her surroundings. Eliminating the lawful-vantage-point concept
would thus be inconsistent with a moral norm.
2. Policies
By "policies" Eisenberg is referring to "states of affairs [that are]
conducive or adverse to the general welfare."3 7 1 Whereas "moral
norms... characterize conduct as right or wrong, policies characterize
states of affairs as good or bad."372 Various policy factors support the
existing rule regarding employer physical surveillance.
For example, the policies that employers should generally be enti-
tled to operate their businesses as they deem fit and that rules that
promote efficiency are generally preferable to rules that do not, sup-
port maintenance of the existing rule. Courts should be wary to sec-
369. One could argue that surveillance does not occur enough for a majority of employ-
ees to be concerned, and thus it is difficult to obtain support for an expansion of
rights that would protect all employees. Although virtually every employee is
aware that his or her employer could be watching, they usually do not believe
that it is happening to them. Such an argument, however, is insufficient to war-
rant court intervention in this matter. While there is merit to the argument that
employees often do not appreciate potential threats to their interests because of-
fensive conduct is not widespread, the fact that the offensive conduct is not wide-
spread suggests that a court-imposed remedy is not necessary, particularly when
one considers the other reasons discussed herein for not changing the existing
rule.
370. I thus disagree with Professor Wilborn drawing an analogy to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000), in support of her
argument that Congress should enact legislation protecting employees' privacy.
See Wilborn, supra note 28, at 884.
371. EISENBERG, supra note 109, at 26.
372. Id.
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ond-guess whether employer practices, particularly those designed to
promote efficiency, are legitimate. As courts have consistently stated,
courts do not act as a super personnel department. 3 73
Additionally, the current rule regarding surveillance provides for
symmetry of information between employers and employees, which in-
creases efficient transactions. 374 The employee knows whether he or
she is malingering, stealing office products, or violating company poli-
cies, but without the use of surreptitious physical surveillance the em-
ployer might lack this same information. Surreptitious surveillance
enables an employer to assess the working relationship accurately and
make efficient decisions, such as terminating an employee who is dis-
covered to be inefficient or who is stealing (or not terminating an em-
ployee because the surveillance proves the employee innocent). An
employer might be able to obtain information that prevents frivolous
litigation, or that results in a just result in litigation, both efficient
outcomes.
In response to this position, critics of employer surveillance (not
necessarily just physical surveillance) often argue that surveillance
does not, in fact, benefit employers. For example, Professor Frank
Cavico argues:
A surveillance system can distort reporting of an individual employee's work
effort by overly emphasizing the quantity of work performed at the expense of
overlooking the quality of the employee's job. Further, there is a risk that the
system will not review employee performance fairly and will not accurately
assess the employee's worth to the employer.3 7 5
Professor Wilborn similarly states that "[a] ny productivity monitoring
should be developed with employee input if the employer wishes the
monitoring to work well."376
If, however, these commentators are correct, employers will not en-
gage in excessive surreptitious workplace surveillance, and the mar-
ket will self-regulate. Ultimately, in deciding whether to engage in a
particular course of lawful activity, employers generally act as ra-
tional profit-maximizers. 3 77 Accordingly, an employment practice
should not be declared inefficient based on speculation; the mere fact
that the practice is engaged in creates a presumption of efficiency.
Furthermore, a policy (as that term is used in Eisenberg's discus-
sion of social propositions) should only be relied on if "it can fairly be
373. See supra note 342.
374. Friedman, supra note 31, at 14 n.30 ("'[E]conomists warn that information flows
should be open evenly lest one side or another gain an unfair advantage during
the transition.... .'" (quoting DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SocIETY 24 (1998))).
375. Cavico, supra note 33, at 1289-90.
376. Wilborn, supra note 28, at 881 n.208.
377. See Timothy F. Malloy, Regulation, Compliance and the Firm, 76 TEMP. L. REV.




implemented by remedies within the power of courts," and are appro-
priately rejected if implementation of the policy results in frustrating
other policies.37 8 Even if one accepted the argument that some moni-
toring is ineffective or inefficient, a rule prohibiting any surveillance
would be over-inclusive and thus still frustrate the policy that efficient
actions should be encouraged. To apply a rule prohibiting only ineffi-
cient or ineffective surveillance, courts and juries would be put in the
difficult position of deciding whether the surveillance was in fact inef-
ficient or ineffective. More importantly, employers would be punished
for surveillance that did not produce the anticipated results.
The policy of "social gravity" also supports the existing rule. "The
policy of social gravity is that morally wrongful conduct should not
give rise to liability unless its consequences are normally of sufficient
importance, in terms of either the societal interests implicated or the
injury likely to result, to justify the social cost of official interven-
tion."37 9 Courts should be wary to provide legal remedies for viola-
tions of moral norms that only cause harm to one's dignity and
emotions; the interests implicated or the injury likely to result do not
usually justify the cost of intervention.
Also, "[a] special group of policies state desirable characteristics of
legal rules,"3 80 and one of the foundational principles on which a legal
rule should be based is that of "replicability," by which Eisenberg
means the ability of lawyers and parties to predict how the law applies
to a particular factual situation.38 1 The use of a clear rule, like the
lawful-vantage-point concept, promotes replicability because it en-
ables lawyers and parties to more easily predict how the law applies to
their situation.
Additionally, the use of a clear rule promotes the goal of objectivity
(another foundational principle upon which a rule should be based),
pursuant to which "a court should reason by articulating and applying
rules that it is ready to apply in the future to all persons who are
situated like the disputants."38 2 The vaguer a rule, the less likely it is
that a court will be viewed as objective when applying the rule.
Whether the existing rule regarding employer surveillance should be
replaced with a standard that, while not as clear, is more consistent
with (alleged) prevailing notions of privacy, can be viewed in terms of
a typical rules-versus-standards debate.3 83 For any rules-versus-
standards debate, the proponent of either a rule or a standard can
378. EISENBERG, supra note 109, at 31.
379. Id. at 29.
380. Id. at 27.
381. Id. at 10-12.
382. Id. at 9.
383. I recognize that the standard could be phrased so favorably for the employee that
the result is a rule that might look as follows: "An employer can never conduct
surreptitious physical surveillance of its employees."
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easily marshal the traditional pros and cons involved in such a de-
bate.38 4 Whether a rule or a standard is preferable will depend on a
balancing of the pros and cons with respect to the particular issue
involved.
With respect to the issue of employers conducting physical surveil-
lance, a clear rule is preferable to a vaguer standard. The inability of
commentators to agree on a definition of privacy demonstrates that an
effort to adopt a standard is virtually hopeless. Even if a standard
could be adopted, it would be so vague as to be incapable of consistent
application by courts, and would not provide any guidance to employ-
ers seeking to conduct surreptitious physical surveillance.
I recognize that this is the type of argument a proponent of a par-
ticular rule always makes against the adoption of a vaguer standard,
but if one analyzes the present issue in terms of a rules-versus-stan-
dards debate, the particular issue involved-invasion of privacy-is
not particularly suited to the use of a standard. This is demonstrated
by the commentators who premise an invasion of privacy on conduct
that is disrespectful or that harms a person's dignity. Such a standard
is an invitation to inconsistency, and would enable a judge to declare
any conduct that he or she deems disrespectful to be tortious. Such a
standard would be inconsistent with the goals of replicability and
objectivity.
A final policy merits consideration-the ability of market forces to
regulate abusive employment practices without court intervention.
The at-will nature of most employment relationships, pursuant to
which an employee is free to end the relationship at any time for any
reason,38 5 will help ensure that employers will not engage in particu-
larly abusive practices. If employers engage in objectionable surveil-
lance, the free market might often remedy this by employees
demanding better treatment. Such demands will carry weight be-
cause employees can threaten to end the employment relationship
without fear of liability, and employees can also threaten to union-
ize.38 6 Public knowledge of such abusive practices might also damage
an employer's recruiting efforts.
384. See generally Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379
(1985).
385. SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MICHAEL C. HARPER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION AND EMPLOYMENT LAw 739 (2000) ("American common law
generally construes employment for an indefinite or unstated term as a relation-
ship which may be terminated 'at will' by either party for any reason or no reason
at all.").
386. For example, even Professor Wilborn believes that "[e]mployee awareness and
fear of employer monitoring and surveillance will grow as the impact of such
monitoring is increasingly felt by the American worker." Wilborn, supra note 28,
at 874 n.186. See also Jenero & Mapes-Riordan, supra note 65, at 97 ("There is
yet another reason for employers to proceed cautiously in the area of electronic
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An employer's concerns about such possibilities will arguably pre-
vent most employers from engaging in abusive practices. 38 7 Thus, as
stated by two commentators, "[Ihf for no other reason than their eco-
nomic self-interest, employers would be well-advised to consider the
'fairness' issues when developing and implementing electronic moni-
toring programs."38 8 Professor Robert Boehmer has acknowledged
that "these market forces, and corresponding moves toward self-regu-
lation, may well serve as a significant limiting factor."3 89 Employers
will also be wary to tempt courts to alter the existing law.
Critics argue that "the market is not truly 'free,' but instead merely
reflects the inherent bargaining advantage employers maintain over
prospective employees." 3 90 In making my argument about self-regula-
tion, I do not intend to suggest that most employees have the power to
negotiate an employment provision with their employer that prohibits
surreptitious physical surveillance.391 But the employment at-will re-
lationship, the potential for employees to unionize, and a good reputa-
monitoring of employees.... [T]he question of'fairness' should not be overlooked.
It is the perception of unfairness that often motivates employees to seek union
representation and compels courts to create new law."). As recognized by Profes-
sor Wilborn, "The perception of mistrust and unfairness resulting from employer
monitoring practices may motivate employees to seek union representation."
Wilborn, supra note 28, at 885. In fact, "[s]ome union contracts regulating the
use of electronic monitoring have been negotiated." Hazards, supra note 302, at
1908.
387. Although this Article addresses surreptitious surveillance, no employer engages
in surreptitious surveillance without the understanding that if it hopes to rely on
such surveillance for taking adverse employment action against the employee
who was the subject of the surveillance, the fact that surveillance was conducted
will most likely have to be disclosed.
388. Jenero & Mapes-Riordan, supra note 65, at 97.
389. Boehmer, supra note 27, at 806.
390. King, supra note 29, at 448.
391. For example, Professor Wilborn argues that "current labor conditions do not per-
mit employees to bargain effectively over the protection of important rights such
as privacy. The global mobility of labor and capital have decreased employees'
ability to bargain." Wilborn, supra note 28, at 886. See also Boehmer, supra note
27, at 763 n.119, 765 ("Due to the significant decrease in the unionized segment
of the United States workforce in recent years, this type of protection is not avail-
able to a large percentage of the workforce," and "the role of organized labor as a
limiting factor (in the use of artificial surveillance devices] will decrease as labor
unionization rates continue to drop."). Professor Finkin is also critical of the ar-
gument that the market will curb abuses of employer power, and the argument
that "if the employee does not like the employer's intrusion.., she is free to quit
and find one whose workplace is less intrusive or less constrained." Finkin, Em-
ployee Privacy, supra note 61, at 255. He argues that such employees "may be
relegated to a secondary labor market." Id. at 256. Professor Boehmer has ar-
gued that "[t]he nature of the employer-employee bargaining relationship is such
that many, if not most, United States employees do not possess the luxury of
simply refusing to enter into the employment relationship when they learn that
intrusive monitoring and surveillance will be one of its key elements." Boehmer,
supra note 27, at 771.
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tion's positive effect on recruiting quality employees will most likely
reduce (if not eliminate) many employer abuses. 39 2 These self-regu-
lating factors are probably already reducing abusive practices, and
there is no evidence that the use of physical surveillance is currently
widespread (even if employer surveillance in general is perhaps in-
creasing).3 93 As Professor Boehmer has recognized with respect to ar-
tificial monitoring of employees in general, "[D]espite this trend
toward [its use], there are signs that some employers are concluding
that the negative effects of artificial monitoring outweigh its benefits
and are consequently reducing its use."39 4
Professor Finkin questions whether the lack of a widespread prob-
lem means that the law should not be changed.395 Finkin notes "that
the law does concern itself with wrongful, but rare, aberrational man-
ager actions,"3 96 and points to the "restroom voyeur" as an exam-
ple.3 9 7 He is correct, but the most extreme employer abuses (such as
conducting surreptitious surveillance of employees in the restroom)
are already tortious.
B. Systemic Consistency
Considerations of systemic consistency support the existing rule.
In this respect, Fourth Amendment law, as a body of law that ad-
dresses when the government can lawfully conduct physical surveil-
lance of its citizens, must be considered. 3 98 Any body of tort law
involving physical surveillance by employers of its employees that
does not take cognizance of Fourth Amendment law is ignoring the
goal of systemic consistency.
392. Critics of the free-market argument assert that "fundamental rights of privacy,
involving human dignity and personal integrity, should not be traded and bar-
gained for like chattel." King, supra note 29, at 448.
393. See Boehmer supra note 27, at 743-44 ("It is, of course, inevitable that some ille-
gitimate use will occur. However, that abuse does not now appear to be occurring
on a large scale .... To the contrary, the most commonly cited employer reasons
for implementing artificial monitoring and surveillance systems appear to be le-
gitimate and are well within the acceptable scope of an ordinary employer-em-
ployee relationship.").
394. Id. at 763.
395. Finkin, Employee Privacy, supra note 61, at 243-44.
396. Id. at 244.
397. Id.
398. Professor Eisenberg's discussion of systemic consistency involves common law
rules being consistent with one another. It seems appropriate, however, when
addressing whether a common law rule is systemically consistent, to consider
statutes and constitutional provisions as well. As stated by Professor Dworkin,
"[T]he adjudicative principle of integrity [Dworkin's theory of adjudication] asks
judges to make law coherent as a whole, so far as they can, and this might be




Systemic consistency does not mean that the tort law rule should
be identical to the Fourth Amendment rule. Because the Fourth
Amendment does not apply to private actors, the Fourth Amendment
should arguably restrict surveillance more than tort law. Although
some critics of existing privacy law might argue that tort privacy
rights regarding employer physical surveillance should exceed those
provided by the Fourth Amendment, such an argument cannot be sus-
tained unless such critics can identify a legitimate reason why the
government should be held to less of a standard than private actors.
This will likely prove difficult, particularly because the government
has traditionally been viewed as the primary threat to individual lib-
erty. For purposes of systemic consistency, the tort-law rule should
thus not restrict surveillance more than the Fourth Amendment. If,
therefore, it turns out the rules under tort law and the Fourth Amend-
ment are essentially the same, altering the tort rules to increase em-
ployee privacy rights would be inconsistent with considerations of
systemic consistency because they would exceed Fourth Amendment
rights.
Although public-sector employees presumably have greater privacy
rights under the Fourth Amendment than employees have under tort
law, 3 9 9 the treatment of physical surveillance under those two sources
of law is, in fact, essentially the same. For example, whereas an at-
tempted intrusion is generally not considered tortious, an attempted
search does not violate the Fourth Amendment. 4 00
Tort law and Fourth Amendment law are also essentially the same
with respect to whether a private matter or activity has been observed
through physical surveillance. As I previously discussed, courts ap-
plying the tort of intrusion to employment settings are applying the
lawful-vantage-point concept, which allows an employer to view any-
thing that would be in plain view from a lawful vantage point. This is
consistent with Fourth Amendment law. Although the Supreme
Court in Katz v. United States401 might have intended to end the no-
tion that a person's constitutionally protected zone of privacy is tied to
places and not persons, even in Katz the court stated that "[wihat a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or of-
fice, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection."40 2 As stated
by one court, "Generally, the police are free to observe whatever may
be seen from a place where they are entitled to be."403 This is consis-
tent with tort law involving physical surveillance.
399. See generally Wilborn, supra note 28, at 866-67.
400. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 n.7 (1998).
401. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
402. Id. at 351.
403. United States v. Fields, 113 F.3d 313, 321 (2d Cir. 1997).
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Under the Fourth Amendment, like tort law, the use of image-en-
hancing equipment does not generally render an otherwise lawful
search unlawful. For example, in On Lee v. United States,40 4 the Su-
preme Court stated in dicta that "[tihe use of bifocals, field glasses or
the telescope to magnify the object of a witness' vision is not a forbid-
den search or seizure, even if they focus without his knowledge or con-
sent upon what one supposes to be private indiscretions."40 5 Professor
Dressler states that "[On] Lee teaches that the sighting of an object in
plain view from a lawful vantage point-even if this sighting occurs
through the use of binoculars or other magnifying devices-does not
constitute a search."40 6
The Supreme Court has not receded from this position. For exam-
ple, in Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,40 7 the Court held that
there was no Fourth Amendment violation when the Environmental
Protection Agency used an image-enhancing camera to take pictures
from a plane.408 (The Court did, however, state that "surveillance of
private property by using highly sophisticated surveillance equipment
not generally available to the public ... might be constitutionally pro-
scribed absent a [search] warrant."4o 9 ) The one exception to On Lee's
statement that has been recognized by lower courts is when image-
enhancing equipment is used to view activities inside a person's
home. 4 10 Thus, Fourth Amendment case law involving the use of im-
age-enhancing equipment is the same as case law involving the tort of
invasion of privacy.
Also, like tort law, a trespass does not automatically make police
surveillance a violation of the Fourth Amendment.4 11 As stated by
one court: "Although police observations made when trespassing are
usually improper, it is not the trespass itself which renders them un-
lawful. Instead, such observations generally violate Fourth Amend-
ment rights simply because those observed cannot reasonably
anticipate observation from vantage points obtained by
trespassing."4 12
The motive needed to render an otherwise unlawful surveillance
lawful is also essentially the same under the Fourth Amendment and
404. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
405. Id. at 754.
406. DRESSLER, supra note 187, at 115.
407. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
408. Id. at 239.
409. Id. at 238.
410. See United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 139 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that use
of enhanced viewing equipment to view inside of suspect's home without warrant
violates Fourth Amendment); United States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252, 1256 (D.
Haw. 1976) (same).




tort law. Under the Supreme Court's decision in O'Connor v.
Ortega,41 3 a public employer need not have probable cause under the
Fourth Amendment to conduct a work-related search.4 14 Rather, the
search is "judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the cir-
cumstances."415 A search is reasonable if there are "reasonable
grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the
employee is guilty of work-related misconduct, or that the search is
necessary for a noninvestigatory work-related purpose."4 16 Although
the Court declined to address whether individualized suspicion is an
essential element of the standard of reasonableness it adopted,417 the
Court described the holdings of the lower courts (which it did not over-
rule) as generally providing that "any 'work-related' search by an
employer satisfies the Fourth Amendment reasonableness require-
ment."4 18 Similarly, under tort law, a private employer's surveillance
of an employee has been held legitimate as long as it is "work
related."4 19
Also, for purposes of systemic consistency, tort remedies, as op-
posed to contract remedies, should be employed cautiously with re-
spect to employment relationships. The employment relationship is a
voluntary undertaking between two parties, and each party has the
opportunity to negotiate the relationship's terms. Thus, contract law
already provides a mechanism for addressing these issues. If a party
to a contractual relationship has failed to contract for protection from
a particular practice by the other party, it is questionable whether
court-created tort law should be used to remedy the employee's failure
to obtain such protection.
VI. CONCLUSION
The tort of invasion of privacy will usually not provide a remedy to
an employee who is subjected to surreptitious physical surveillance by
his or her employer. The lack of such a remedy stems from the rule
that an employer is generally entitled to conduct surreptitious physi-
cal surveillance of its employees from any lawful vantage point. On
413. 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
414. Id. at 724.
415. Id. at 725-26.
416. Id. at 726.
417. Id.
418. Id. at 720-21 (citing United States v. Nasser, 476 F.2d 1111, 1123 (7th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Collins, 349 F.2d 863, 868 (2d Cir. 1965)). See also R. Scott
McClain, Comment, The Expanding Spectrum of Permissible Public Employee
Drug Testing, 1990 DETROIT C. L. REV. 727, 740 ("Generally, the lower courts
have held that any 'work-related' search by an employer satisfies the fourth
amendment reasonableness requirement.").
419. Salazar v. Golden State Warriors, No. 99-4825, CRB, 2000 WL 246586, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2000).
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balance, this rule is preferable to a vague standard based on a broader
definition of privacy than is currently employed by the courts. The
inability to show that the law is contrary to existing social norms, the
difficulty involved in scrutinizing the benefits of employer practices,
and the fact that the employment at-will doctrine and the ability of
employees to unionize will likely minimize (and perhaps has mini-
mized) abusive practices, all demonstrate that a change in existing
law by the courts is not warranted.
